Global Peace Operations 2012

The United Nations Security Council authorized two new peacekeeping missions during 2011—the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)—the first missions since the joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established in 2007.

The Council also authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, clearing the way for a NATO air campaign that divided members of the Security Council. Following the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, the Security Council mandated the civilian UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a political mission, to help reestablish state authority.

Brought to you by NYU's Center on International Cooperation, the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations covers both UN and non-UN peace operations during 2011. The latest edition focuses on the role of peacekeeping operations in extending and consolidating state authority in post-conflict and post-crisis states.

This edition covers a year that saw continued overall growth in peacekeeping operations, albeit at a slower rate than past years. However, UN peacekeeping experienced a decline in the deployment of uniformed personnel, the first such decline since 2003. This is despite the two new peacekeeping missions.

 Peacekeepers in 2011 were tasked with responding to a number of rapidly changing environments including supporting the referendum on South Sudan, and supporting its establishment as an independent state; elections in Haiti, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo; the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire; and wresting control of Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

All of these activities occurred against the backdrop of intense debate on the cost of peacekeeping, with increasing pressure to draw down a number of missions. The preoccupation with mission costs and the lighter footprint of these missions may indicate that a decade of large multidimensional peacekeeping missions may be coming to an end.

 

Global Peace Operations 2012

Overview of the US Intelligence Community via Prezi

Quick Rundown on the Worldwide Threat Assessment

The U.S. Intelligence/Security Chiefs have now offered Congress their agency's and Community's annual view on the state of the world.

 The US Director of National Intelligence (James Clapper) delivered his "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community." He began with the usual acknowledgement that we live in complicated and volatile times, and that fiscal constraints don't make matters any easier. Here are a couple of excerpts on top-tier, overarching issues:

 Threats: 

...it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. 









Terrorism: 

•  The next two to three years will be a critical transition phase for the terrorist threat facing the United States, particularly from al-Qa‟ida and like-minded groups, which we often refer to as the “global jihadist movement.” 

• - AQ leadership will become increasingly decentralized, and the organization is likely to become more fragmented. 

•  - AQ's role will become increasingly symbolic, and will probabaly seek to execute smaller, simpler plots to demonstrate relevance to the global jihad AQ's regional affiliates

• —al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab—will remain committed to the group's ideology, and in terms of threats to US interests will surpass the remnants of core al-Qa'ida in Pakistan

• . ...a mass attack by foreign terrorist groups involving a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapon in the United States is unlikely in the next year, (although they) worry about a more limited Chemical, Biological or Radiological attack, particularly by lone actors. 

•  in the near term the threat in the United States from homegrown violent extremists (HVE) will be characterized by lone actors or small groups inspired by al-Qa'ida's ideology but not formally affiliated with it or other related groups.

Iran: 

• The 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States shows that some Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived US actions that threaten the regime. 

• Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities (expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities) that better position it to produce such weapons. 

• Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. 

North Korea: 

• North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia. We remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology.  

Cyber Threats: 

•  Cyber threats pose a critical national and economic security concern due to the continued advances in—and growing dependency on—the information technology (IT) that underpins nearly all aspects of modern society. 

• Among state actors, China and Russia are of particular concern ... entities within these countries are responsible for extensive illicit intrusions into US computer networks and theft of US intellectual property. 

• Nonstate actors are also playing an increasing role in international and domestic politics through the use of social media technologies. 

Foreign Intelligence Threats (next 2-3 years): 

• Cyber-Enabled Espionage. FIS have launched numerous computer network operations targeting US Government agencies, businesses, and universities. We assess that many intrusions into US networks are not being detected. Although most activity detected to date has been targeted against unclassified networks connected to the Internet, foreign cyber actors have also begun targeting classified networks. 

• Insider Threats. Insiders have caused significant damage to US interests from the theft and unauthorized disclosure of classified, economic, and proprietary information and other acts of espionage. We assess that trusted insiders using their access for malicious intent represent one of today‟s primary threats to US classified networks. 

• Espionage by China, Russia, and Iran. Russia and China are aggressive and successful purveyors of economic espionage against the United States. Iran‟s intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber capabilities, have dramatically increased in recent years in depth and complexity. We assess that FIS from these three countries will remain the top threats to the United States in the coming years.

You can read about the array of Global Challenges and the entirety of Director Clapper's entire testimony HERE.

 

Armed Conflict Mapped Over Time and Location

Ralph Sundberg, a Ph.D. Candidate and Project Manager  at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), manages the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) - an effort he began in 2009 to make reliable, geographically and temporally disaggregated data available to scholars of armed conflict.  


The project’s first phase aggregates annual data from the 1989-2010 time period into three categories of organised violence: state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence. 



Take a look at this short video of organized violence in 1989-2010.  Based on the GED, is shows conflict events mapped over time and space. 


Popout


The GED data can be found here: http://ucdp.uu.se/ged/

Armed Conflicts Declined Worldwide in 2010

ACR-2011 Poster

Project Ploughshares just published its 2011 Armed Conflicts Report, which covers the 2010 calendar year. Ploughshares has assembled this report every year since 1987.

Here are some of the highlights:

• In 2000, the number of armed conflicts worldwide began to decline. It blipped upward again toward the latter half of the decade, then stabilized in 2008-2009. In 2010, the number dropped, bringing it back down below the plateau. 

• In 2010 there were 24 active armed conflicts worldwide. 

• No new conflicts were added in 2010. 

• Conflicts in four countries--Nepal, Burundi, Sri Lanka and Uganda--appear to have ended. 

• Africa and Asia still host 75% of the world's armed conflicts, even accounting for the four that ended there. 

• Between 2001 and 2010 thirty two (32) conflicts ended, and only twelve (12) conflicts started or re-emerged. Only 5 of those 12 are still active. 

Conclusion: While this trend means that very few new conflicts have emerged in the last decade, it also points to the protracted nature of many of the world’s armed conflicts, the overwhelming majority of which have been active for well over a decade.

You can check out these excellent resources for the ACR Report:

• ACR 2011 Summary
• Conflict Descriptions
• Interactive Armed Conflicts Report map
• Armed Conflicts Report Graphs
• Download the 22" by 34" Armed Conflicts 2011 poster

Warthinker’s Digest- December 9, 2011

Warthinker’s Digest- December 9, 2011

Warthinker’s Digest is a feature of the Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict blog that scans the scholarly literature from academia, government agencies, and major think tanks, highlighting new reports and documents bearing on the complexity of conflict and future trends in warfare.  A must-read feature for defense and security strategists from all sectors interested in developing their “actionable intellect.”

The Idiot Jihadist Next Door

Authors: Louis Klarevas,  Foreign Policy, December 1, 2011

Klarevas examines the case of Jose Pimentel in New York.  Pimentel was nabbed by NYPD while cobbling together a homemade pipe bomb. Some politicians were quick to offer Pimentel’s arrest as further alarming evidence of a growing and evolving “homegrown terrorism” threat from al Qa’ida.     Klarevas questions that assumption, and presents the view that Pimentel is just the latest addition to a “list of boneheaded jihadist wannabes.”    Why such a harsh accusation?

·         Jose Pimentel launched a website that explicitly advocated violence against American citizens, along with bomb making instructions.  Guess what?  Authorities noticed.

·         Pimentel, like others on Klarevas’ list, were seduced by the lure of bomb building but found the best they could do was to expend a lot of effort to create a clunky and not-so-awe-inspiring device that may or may not function as intended.

·         Although Pimentel posted “how-to” instructions on his to share his “expertise,” the truth is he had trouble putting one together himself.  He needed help.   Fortunately, he found a knowledgeable associate to assist with the devices…. But his trusty assistant was actually and NYPD informant.  Imagine that.

Examining the case of Jose Pimentel, one leaves with the impression that if he had used the time he spent chest-thumping on the interwebs to go outside and find a large stick, he probably could have done more damage with that than with his aspirational doomsday device.

Klarevas does not suggest that we ignore the threat of terrorism, but he does make an important point about not overstating the homegrown threat.  Some of the bumblers on Klarevas’ wannabe list have tried.  Few have succeeded.  He wraps up with one of my new favorite quotes:   “Just to put this in perspective, more Americans have been killed here at home by contaminated cantaloupe in the past few months than have been killed by violent Islamic extremists in the past decade!”

You can read the full article HERE.

Strategic Planning in Fragile and Conflict Contexts

Author: Center on International Cooperation // New York University

The primary audience for this research paper is the strategic planner in fragile and conflict-affected states [FCAS], understood broadly as any actor involved in either the formulation of national priorities to mitigate or recover from conflict, or the design of international strategies to support such priorities. The paper explores the tensions and tradeoffs incurred throughout the planning process on a range of engagement principles, including national ownership, prioritization, and sequencing. It aims to serve two purposes:

i.                     provide a broad concept of key elements of planning and

ii.                   identify key recommendations for engagement as well as policy and capacity gaps in the international community’s support of strategic planning processes.

The first section of the paper offers general considerations related to i. the tradeoffs and tensions inherent to strategic planning processes in FCAS, and ii. the challenges and opportunities that planners face, as a means to set the context and rationale for the guidance and recommendations presented throughout the paper. The second and third sections discuss the prerequisites for and the actual steps of the strategic planning process, with a focus on current practice and its range of tradeoffs and tensions, including challenges in formulating results for greater accountability and issues related, inter alia, to ownership, prioritization, and funding. The conclusion presents a summary of findings, along with key policy recommendations drawn from the analysis and the case studies, as well as suggested areas where further research could strengthen the international community’s capacities to support strategic planning processes. SOURCE: Center on International Cooperation // New York University // Hosted by Research for Development

You can read the full report HERE. 

Violent Conflict and the Very Poorest

Author: Chronic Poverty Research Centre

Most so-called civil wars take place in poor countries. Non-war violence is also prevalent in countries with high levels of poverty. Non-war violence includes sexual violence, communal riots and pogroms, high urban homicide rates and gang violence, rural land and labour conflicts, and so on. Such violence is pervasive not just in the ‘least developed countries’ but also in large middle-income developing countries with high concentrations of extreme poverty: countries like Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. This much is clear even with a fairly narrow, straightforwardly physical definition of violence. This paper aims to set out the significance of understanding and addressing the links between violence and extreme poverty. Section 2 discusses the impact of violent conflict on the poor, and on the very poorest, while Section 3 examines the contribution of extreme poverty to the causation of violent conflict. Section 4 draws out conclusions. SOURCE: Chronic Poverty Research Centre

You can read the full report HERE. 

 

Ten Years of Fragile States: What Have We Learned?

Author:  Laurence Chandy, Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development

Ten years ago this month, the World Bank established a taskforce to examine how the development community, and the bank in particular, should approach fragile states. This project took on special significance in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, as Western governments awoke to the threats posed by weak and unstable countries, and expressed a new willingness to engage with them.

Looking back at the taskforce’s report, there is much that remains salient and even prescient. For instance, the report frames the development agenda for fragile states around a narrow prioritization of reforms, starting with security, stability and the rule of law; emphasizes the attainment of feasible, quick wins; and advocates looking beyond government channels for service delivery. Engagement strategies stress the need for sociopolitical analysis and much deeper forms of donor coordination. Many of these same ideas will, ironically, be presented as new innovations at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea later this month. SOURCE: Brookings Institution

You can read the full report HERE.

 

Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of “Transcending Clan Politics”

Author:  Ahren Schaefer, Andrew Black

The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

Clan identity and Islam are central pillars of Somali society, with clan dynamics and inter-clan rivalries magnified by decades of state collapse. Al-Shabaab - the dominant Islamist militia controlling much of southern and central Somalia - claims to “transcend clan politics,” yet reality on the ground belies this claim, revealing that al-Shabaab seeks to manipulate local clan alliances and remains deeply influenced by clan politics. This analysis shows that despite al-Shabaab’s hard-line Islamist identity and pro-al-Qaeda rhetoric, many aspects of the group’s past and current behavior remain deeply rooted in Somalia’s local dynamics. Moreover, clan rules apply even to Somalia’s most feared Islamists. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

You can read the full article HERE. 

Can You Predict World Events Better Than Most...?

Editor's Note:  In March, I shared on this site the opportunity to participate in a "Forecasting World Events" study.  If you are already signed up for that study, you are not eligible to participate in this one.  But if not, and if you love the thought of anticipating questions like whether Hugo Chavez will be President of Venezuela, whether Italy will default on its foreign debt,  whether US troop levels in Afghanistan will drop below 50,000, whether a Category 4 or 5 hurricane will make landfall in Florida, or whether Apple will become the most valuable company in the world ... please read on!-RB

Call for Research Participants 

The System for Prediction, Aggregation, Display, and Elicitation (SP♠DE) team would like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in an interactive, online research study aimed at exploring the field of forecasting. This is a federally funded research effort sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) to learn how judgments made by a widely dispersed and diverse group of individuals may be used to increase forecast accuracies. Your participation will include providing forecasts to questions relating to economic, political, cultural, and global security domains via an interactive website. Your predictions to these questions may be based on your individual knowledge or based on available information provided to you by other research participants.

Eligibility Information: U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older with expertise in specific subject matter may be eligible to participate. Additionally, individuals with diverse educational levels (e.g., bachelor’s degrees to Ph.D.s) across a range of disciplines are preferred.

Study Duration: The research study is expected to commence in summer 2011 and conclude in 2014. Although we encourage you to participate in the study as long as possible, we understand that some individuals will not be available to do so for the entire three year length of the program. In such instances, please know that you may withdraw at any time.

Participant Involvement: Since data collection for this effort is in the format of an online survey, you will have the flexibility of offering your forecasts around your schedule. We encourage you to stay active with the study’s website throughout your involvement with the study.

Economic Considerations: In addition to providing the field of forecasting invaluable data, you will be financially compensated for your involvement with the study. You will be paid $575 for responding to approximately 100 forecast problem sets listed on the study’s website over the course of one year. Responding to forecast problem sets includes original responses to a forecast problem, updates to the forecast problem over time, and additional input in regards to specific forecast problems. Additionally, you will be further compensated $575 for each additional year that you provide forecasts to approximately 100 forecast problem sets for up to three years of participation. If you decide to withdraw from the study prior to the study’s first year of completion, you will be compensated in accordance with how long you have been active in the study up until that point.

Staff Support: Although you will have a great deal of freedom in regards to your study participation (e.g., when/how often you visit the website, how long you wish to participate, etc.), support from the research staff is never more than a phone call or email away. Our dedicated support staff is readily available to answer any questions/concerns that you may have, arrange payments, and ensure that your participation in this research effort is a positive experience.

Even More Study Details:  To register as a participant or just to learn more about this unique research opportunity, please visit the SP♠DE website at www.iSPADE.net. Once you have registered, you will be contacted by a member of the research staff to determine your eligibility and obtain some preliminary information about you. Finally, participation in similar, online forecasting research studies sponsored by IARPA is prohibited while you are involved with the SP♠DE program. Thank you in advance for your interest and consideration.

 SP♠DE is managed by The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc., including members from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Martin Research and Consulting (MRAC), and Mercyhurst College.

 

Mohsen Milani Discusses Libya Turmoil

Iran’s Ties to the Taliban

August 10, 2011 | 11:59am

Mohsen Milani

What is the status of Iran's relations with the Taliban today? Have there been significant changes since 2001?

The Islamic Republic of Iran has no official relation with the Taliban. Nor do the Taliban have an office or a representative in Tehran, as do many non-state actors, such as HAMAS. At the same time, Tehran has recognized that the Taliban have remarkable resiliency and are an integral component of the Afghan society that cannot be ignored. As there have been persistent reports that President Hamid Karzai, the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia all have opened their channels of communications with the Taliban, Tehran is determined not to become marginalized and seems to have tried to open its own non-diplomatic and secret channels of communication. But the Taliban are not monolithic, and it is not clear with which faction Iran is seeking to establish relations.

How has Iran’s view of the Taliban changed since the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001?

Iran’s views of the Taliban have changed considerably since 2001. Iran did not recognize the Taliban government and considered them an ideological nemesis and a major security threat that was created by Pakistan’s ISI, with generous financial support from Saudi Arabia partly for the purpose of spreading Wahhabism and undermining Iran. When the Taliban were in power in the 1990s, Iran, along with India and Russia, provided significant support to the Northern Alliance, which was the principal opposition force to Taliban rule and eventually dislodged them. Iran also contributed to dismantling the Taliban regime and to establishing a new government in Kabul in 2001.

Today, the Taliban have evolved into a formidable armed organization fighting U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Ironically, the strategic interests of Tehran and Taliban have converged today, as each, independent of the other and for different reasons, oppose the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and demand their immediate and unconditional withdrawal.

Is Iran providing tangible financial, military or political support for the Taliban?

There have been numerous public reports about support for the Taliban coming from Iran. There are reports that elements within the Revolutionary Guards may have transferred long-range rockets to the Taliban and provided training for the Taliban. In February 2011, British forces reportedly intercepted in Afghanistan a shipment of 48 122-mm rockets that they claimed had originated from Iran. Spokesmen of the Islamic Republic have consistently denied all these allegations. Such denials, even if we assume their validity, do not preclude the possibility that non-state actors within Iran may be used by the government to provide weapons or training to some factions within the Taliban organization.

From a strategic perspective, the Iranian government looks at the Taliban as a useful enemy that is undermining the interests of its other enemy, namely the United States. Therefore, it should not be surprising at all if the Iranian government supports the Taliban or if it looks the other away as behind-the-scenes support is provided by Iran’s non-state actors to the Taliban. Such support, however, appears to be very limited. The apparent goal is to empower the Taliban sufficiently to remain a major headache to the United States, but not to an extent that would allow them to seriously undermine the Karzai government or become the dominant force in all of Afghanistan.

What is Tehran’s position on a Taliban-controlled government in Kabul?

A Taliban-dominated government is clearly not in Iran’s long-term interests, since it would generate considerable tension and conflict between Iran and Afghanistan and would inevitably lead Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, becoming dominant foreign powers in Afghanistan, which Tehran vehemently opposes. At the same time, Tehran has for many years maintained that political stability in Afghanistan can be achieved only if the government reflects the rich ethnic and sectarian diversity of Afghanistan itself. Iran, more than anything else, wants to see a stable and friendly government in Kabul. Tehran now seems convinced that without Taliban participation in the government, as a partner but not as the main force, stability would be unattainable.

What is the state of Tehran’s relations with the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai?

The bilateral relationship remains friendly, but not devoid of tension. Karzai has deftly managed to simultaneously have good relations with Tehran and Washington. Tehran continues with its heavy involvement in Afghan reconstruction, and trade between the two countries has increased substantially.

Still, Tehran has not abandoned its support for its traditional allies among the non-Pushtun Afghans, notably the Northern Alliance and the Shiite Hazarats. Tehran continues to express its displeasure with the way Kabul has handled the relatively free crossing of the Jondollah terrorist group into Iran, and with the flow of narcotics into Iran.

The major tension between Kabul and Tehran, however, is their diametrically opposed views regarding the presence and future of U.S./NATO troops. Tehran has attempted in vain to convince Karzai to call for the withdrawal of Western troops. Tensions between the two neighbors are likely to increase if there is a new agreement between Washington and Kabul about establishing permanent U.S. military bases in Afghanistan.

How does Iranian influence in Afghanistan compare to its influence in Iraq? Which of the two countries is more important to Iran strategically?

Strategically, economically, and ideologically, Iraq is much more important than Afghanistan for Iran. Iran also exerts much more influence and has much more leverage in Iraq than in Afghanistan. Iran’s friends are much more organized in Iraq than they are in Afghanistan. Trade between Iran and Iraq has increased substantially, surpassing trade between Iran and Afghanistan. Iraq is now one of Iran’s major trading partners.

Politically and ideologically, Iran is much closer to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad than to the Sunni/Pushtun-dominated government of Hamid Karzai. While good relations with Karzai are important for Tehran, the relationship does not have profound international ramifications. Afghanistan’s strategic importance for Iran lies in the fact that American troops are stationed there. The case of Iraq is fundamentally different. Close relations between Tehran and Baghdad -- two major oil exporters -- or a political alliance between the two would be a game changer and would have significant economic ramifications for the world. It could also change the strategic balance of power in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

Read Mohsen Milani's article on Iran and Afghanistan in "The Iran Primer"

Mohsen Milani is chairman of the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida.

Seven Pillars of Small War Power

How might we think differently about a “center of gravity” in an environment where asymmetric strategy dominates and power is diffused? Insurgencies and movements of resistance are dynamic, living systems powered by social dynamics.Successful insurgent movements leverage their available sources of power to gain the sympathy of the broader population and to mobilize a small cadre of armed forces. For the insurgent, these dynamics—the power of rising expectations, the power of the people, the power of the underdog, the power of agility, the power of resistance, the power of security, and the power of belonging—become the pillars of small war power. For the counterinsurgent, each of these pillars presents both a potential hazard and an exploitable vulnerability.

The full article from Military Review is available for free download HERE.

Global Peacekeeping Operations

New York University’s Center on International Cooperation recently released The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011, a comprehensive monitoring effort that began in 2006. The 2011 Report focuses on managing peacekeeping transitions: defined as the withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation and the handing over of responsibility to national authorities, another international presence, or other regional and local actors.

Overall, global peacekeeping—in terms of total troops, military observers, and police—grew by 32% over the year to reach more than 256,000 peacekeepers in 2010 – compared with nearly 194,000 in 2009. However, despite continued growth, these numbers belie a considerable slowing in the rate of increase for UN peacekeeping operations – reflecting the operational, political and financial pressure to scale down in overall size.

No large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations have been mandated in the past four years, and the Report suggests a waning interest by the international community in taking on any new ones. Nevertheless, the need for stabilizing intervention continues in areas like Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, Haiti, and possibly Libya.

HERE you can read an article by Andrew Sinclair, published in the Journal of International Peace Operations, that summarizes some key findings from the Report

Rethinking policy responses on fragile states

Rethinking policy responses on fragile states

Fernanda Faria

Executive Summary

The evolving policy discourse on fragile states has covered many of the criticisms made of the concept itself and its policy implications, including the need to be context specific, build on local systems of governance, engage for the long-term and beyond state institutions, and consider how having an international presence affects internal power dynamics. While new and innovative approaches have started to emerge in some of the academic work being done on fragile states (eg, the emergence of “hybrid political orders”, the role of non-state actors), there is still a gulf between policy discourse and practice. In an attempt to address the fragmentation of the actors, mandates, objectives, cultures, and bureaucratic logics involved in peacebuilding and statebuilding, on-going efforts to improve international support to fragile states tend to focus mainly on internal organisation, means, knowledge, capacity, policy coherence and coordination.

As laudable and difficult as such efforts may be, they risk merely covering up other more fundamental shortcomings of the international action being taken in fragile contexts. Ultimately the main driver for change in the way international actors operate in fragile states is politics. International support needs to build on an understanding of the local political context – including the internal political dynamics that operate both among local actors and between them and external actors – and go beyond state-centred approaches that fail to take on board how fragile states actually operate. There is also a need for clearer political guidance and greater transparency around the role of international actors and the political motivations, objectives and impact of their interventions in fragile states.

The issue of “fragile states” had been addressed in academic literature and policy circles well before it started to attract increasing political attention post 9/11. The formation and/or crisis of the state, which is at the basis of the fragile states debate, has long been researched and debated in academic literature, especially in relation to state formation in the post-colonial period. The political use of the notion of the weak, failing or failed state is not new either and, as pointed out by Jonathan Di John, was specifically used to justify colonial rule. However, it re-emerged more prominently as part of the international policy agenda in the 1990s as a result of different (albeit inter-related) humanitarian, development and security concerns and priorities that began to adopt policy approaches which sought to address fragile states in a comprehensive manner.

Good governance a core concern

As the first section of this paper outlines, policy approaches to fragile states have been influenced by, among other things, poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the concepts of human security and “responsibility to protect” (R2P), new approaches and modalities for aid effectiveness, democratic governance, conflict prevention and resolution, and the “war on terror”. However, these are not necessarily convergent or complementary policy agendas and have thus resulted in varied, and sometimes divergent, policies and political approaches and goals. Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus among international actors that peacebuilding and statebuilding should be the overarching goals guiding policy thinking and external assistance in fragile states.

At the core of international concerns and current policy responses in fragile states is the issue of good governance. International actors, and many people in developing countries, increasingly see governance as the “missing link” in the security-development nexus, and a key reason why cooperation policies have largely failed to promote sustainable development and stability. Governance has thus come to be a key feature of donor strategies in fragile states. However, despite donor rhetoric about upholding/supporting governance in fragile states, commitment, in practice, appears to be much more tentative and ad hoc.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas merge

The evolution of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas, as well as the many challenges and tensions faced and caused (intentionally or not) by external interventions and support in fragile contexts are discussed in the second section of this report. Both agendas combine development, governance, and security and appear to be increasingly joined-up.

Peacebuilding was initially associated with peacekeeping efforts in conflict and immediate post-conflict contexts, but the first generation of peacebuilding missions failed to stop some of those countries from slipping back into violent conflict. The shortcomings of those missions were partly attributed to having too narrow a focus on rapid political and economic reforms and placing too much emphasis on quick gains and a rapid withdrawal. Since then the concept of peacebuilding has thus expanded to include both the prevention of violent conflict and efforts to help bring about lasting peace. However, some see the inclusion of statebuilding as part of peacebuilding as problematic and possibly counter-productive.

Statebuilding, for its part, no longer focuses exclusively on the reconstruction of political institutions in the aftermath of conflict and state collapse, or on the role of institutional state actors alone. It is recognised as being primarily an endogenous process involving a diversity of actors and not just a top-down process, but also one in which state institutions have a key role to play. Many donors now believe that international actors must base their priorities on an understanding of the interaction and mediating processes between state and society at their various levels, as well as between social groups. It is also recognised that statebuilding is a complex, lengthy and non-linear process and that donors may need to be in for the long haul.
Gaps between the rhetoric and practice

While there is clearly an overlap between peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives, the merging of the two agendas is not without problem. The multitude of actors involved, all with different and sometimes conflicting political agendas, priorities, guiding principles and rules, funding mechanisms, experiences, timeframes and pressures to deliver renders agreement on a shared strategy and international coordination extremely difficult.

The final section examines the significant gaps between the rhetoric and practice of international donors, as well as the limitations of the role of international actors and their ability to support peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in fragile states. Operational, institutional, and intellectual barriers are standing in the way of changes to a donor approach that tends to be highly rule-based, technocratic and compartmentalised. New donor structures and approaches are being developed.

However, while institutional reorganisation and capacity-building, improved knowledge and understanding of the political economy of the context, greater awareness of and sensitivity to deeply contextual issues such as legitimacy, and greater attention to governance and security-related issues are all positive steps, they do not constitute a miracle cure for the fragmentation of the actors, mandates and objectives involved in peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. To counter this fragmentation, there needs to be a shared understanding of the political context and a political strategy on how to achieve common objectives and priorities. So far, despite the political rhetoric around ownership, alignment and context-based solutions and the recognition that diverse forms of state organisation exist, there appears to be little substantial change in the way international actors operate in fragile states.

This policy brief forms part of the NOREF project, supported by the Ford Foundation, on the internal and external dimensions of state fragility.

Read the full report HERE

Can we thank the U.N. for reducing armed conflict?

Ernie Regehr, a Research Fellow at the University of Waterloo's Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, recently published an interesting and useful Background Paper, titled Armed Conflict: Trends and Drivers. The analysis leans heavily on a 2006 synopsis written by Gareth Evans of ICG, but Regehr also draws materials from Project Ploughshares' annual Armed Conflicts Report and the Human Security Report 2009/2010.

Armed Conflict is fundamentally defined as a political conflict involving armed combat by the armed forces of a state or the forces of one or more armed factions seeking a political end,in which at least 1,000 people have been directly killed in the fighting.

The good news is, when the dust settled on the conclusion of the Cold War, armed conflicts declined and the number continued to drop through the 2000s. The bad news (or part of it) is that "one-third of the conflicts that were underway in 1987 are still active today." So, if anyone needs a reminder, modern war is a marathon. It is also a breeding ground for mass atrocities. In fact about 85% of mass atrocities occur in the context of an existing armed conflict.

Regehr's paper thoughtfully acknowledges the increasingly blurry lines between political violence and criminal violence and the complexity of fitting terrorism into a specific category, but does not belabor the point.

The report then goes on to discuss different types of war, how wars end, and the human toll of armed conflicts. Death tolls are notoriously hard to count accurately, but based on estimates from the Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV) and from Ploughshares, the number may fall between 45,000 and 52,000 each year.

What drives these conflicts? With a nod to Thomas Ohlson and Alex Bellamy, the report suggest four major causes: Grievances, Identity (intergroup conflict), Capacity; and (Perceived) Absence of alternatives. It provides an interesting and thoughtful discussion of each.

The final section attempts to unpack the question of why armed conflict has declined in recent years and what implications those reasons might have for preventing conflict in the future. The report contains a concise list of explanations for international and civil wars drawn from the Human Security Report. These range from an increase in the number of democratic states and international institutions to growing economic interdependence, declines in ethnic discrimination, and "normative" shifts away from war. Citing Evans and the Human Security report, Regehr suggests a great deal of credit for for the decline in interstate wars goes to the United Nations (UN) and its bolstered efforts in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. Though the trends of declining conflict and increased UN diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives have certainly run concurrently, whether there is a causal link between them may remain an open question.

You can read the full report HERE.

Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia

CSIS analysts Anthony Cordesman (The Burke Chair in Strategy) and Andrew C. Gagel used data from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s (NCTC) World Wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) to examine patterns of terrorist attacks in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia from 2007-2010. Because the data end in 2010, the authors note, they do not reflect the wave of instability and unrest that swept through the region this Spring.

North Africa:

Algeria was the main hot spot for terrorism in North Africa. Most of the attacks were committed by militant extremists who are - or aspire to be - affiliated with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM's momentum is also creating a regional threat to SubSaharan Africa as well.

Middle East:

Terrorism in the Middle East is more ubiquitous and more diverse. Terrorist actors include semi-secular movements, Sunni and Shi’a extremist groups, and Jewish extremist groups. Their violence is committed in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and, Iraq. Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have driven much of the region's violence, but Hamas and the Islamic State of Iraq/Mujahideen Shura Council have contributed significantly as well, especially in Gaza an Iraq.

In southern Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continues to be an active source of terrorist violence. Within the Southern Gulf region, overall terrorist activity was lower, but most of the area's attacks occurred in Yemen and were linked to al-Qa’ida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).

Central & South Asia

Terrorist activity in the Af/Pak region accounted for much of the Central/South Asian terrorist violence from 2007-1010. In Afghanistan, Taliban drove much of the violence (which was most pronounced in Helmand and the Af/Pak border region) and killed, injured or kidnapped more indigenous Afghans during that time period than any other group. In Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) were responsible for most the most of known attacks and deaths there.

India was affected by a number of terrorist actors (both foreign and indigenous), but violence was driven principally by militant Islamists and Maoists. Groups with links to Pakistan were clearly the most dangerous. Continuing terrorist violence in Sri Lanka was mostly linked to ethnic civil conflicts.

You can read the full report HERE.

Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010. By Andrew C. Gagel and Anthony H. Cordesman. CSIS.