SOCOM Commander Sees & Understands the Big Picture

I continue to be impressed by Adm. Eric Olson's deep and sophisticated understanding of contemporary armed conflict. When I have made this observation before, some have responded to me that his conclusions are actually rather obvious and so widely shared that they hardly merit recognition. What I find so encouraging, however, is that the leader of the world's most elite and lethal kinetic force understands that - in his words - "it’s the nonkinetic that will be decisive." In a large organization where those wielding hammers tend to see nothing but nails, Olson both understands and acts on the fact that a full array of tools are needed to get the job done. In my view, that is commendable and distinctive.

Yesterday (1/20/10), Olson testified before The House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism And Unconventional Threats where he highlighted some of the following points

• Regional AQ affiliate groups are a growing concern. The networking of affiliate groups has two pernicious effects: (1) it extends AQ’s global reach, posing an increasing threat to North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, India, Southeast Asia, and again in the United States; (2) it provides a more diversified infrastructure for recruitment and training.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a rising affiliate group that is benefiting from this process and whose leadership ranks are made up in part from Saudi and Yemeni extremists who have been released from detention or escaped from Yemeni jails.

• The network is still largely built on personal connections and relationships developed during the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s. Its growth and resilience are enabled by a convergence of instability, crime, corruption, and disruptive migration in the region.

The network sustains its operations mainly through individual relationships that are rooted in the 1980’s Afghanistan jihad against the former Soviet Union. The strength and tenacity of this network is due to the environment in which it functions. It is woven in the fabric of multi-ethnic communities, working with legitimate companies and charities while simultaneously exploiting the criminal networks to move people, money, and supplies around the world. Al-Qaida thrives on sources of friction created by a growing nexus between extremism, crime, and migration.

• AQ affiliate groups are increasingly stepping into ungoverned or under-governed spaces where they can more easily leverage a base of population support through aid or coercion.

The problems we must be prepared to address include the inability of nation states to deal with increasingly complex challenges and to meet the needs and expectations of their populations. These challenges are exacerbated by the growing number of non-state actors who have strategic effect in a networked and interconnected world. In the vacuum created by weak or failed governments, non-state actors have achieved greater influence over benign populations by addressing their basic needs and grievances, and by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing them into submission. When governments fail to address the needs of the population, they become irrelevant and the people will make choices that are shaped by their own immediate needs for survival.

Adm. Olson concludes with the following:

We believe that SOF must simultaneously focus on the environmental dynamics and root causes that create today’s and tomorrow’s threats and adversaries. This belief requires an approach that is integrated with our interagency partners to foster US credibility and influence among relevant populations. We clearly recognize that deterring, disrupting and defeating terrorist will require a whole-of-government and international approach.

You can read the testimony in its entirety HERE.

Transnational Threats Update

The latest update from CSIS' Transnational Threats Project is now available.




Transnational Threats Update November-December 2009
Vol. 7, No. 9

By Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas M. Sanderson
Jan 19, 2010

The Transnational Threats Update is produced by the Transnational Threats Project and provides monthly reports and analysis on terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and arms trafficking.

In this issue:

• Domestic Radicalization Gaining Ground?
• Russian Terrorism
• Saudi Arabia Brings the Heat to Yemen
• Lashkar-e-Taiba Goes Global
• Political Violence in the Philippines
• Thai Authorities Make Arms Trade Bust
• AQIM Runs Drugs to Europe
• Kingpin’s Death Leaves Wake of Violence
• Drone Disaster?
• Did Citibank Get Hacked by the Russian Mafia?

Lessons (or maybe just “Observations”) from the Cases of Abdulmutallab and Hasan

Lessons (or maybe just “Observations”) from the Cases of Abdulmutallab and Hasan

The expression: “Hindsight is 20/20,” captures the common wisdom of an empirical finding known as hindsight bias. The basic idea is that specific outcomes and consequences seem much more likely after – rather than before - they have occurred. Events seem to be more easily foreseeable after they have happened. A recent Washington Post article on the Hasan case says: “When viewed in retrospect, Hasan's life becomes an apparent trail of evidence that leads to an inevitable end.”

There are several factors that contribute to this common cognitive bias. One condition that fosters hindsight bias after catastrophic events is that after-the-fact most of the evidence is assembled together in one place, when previously the facts were scattered about. And, of course, all “warning signs” seem much more predictive and significant when we already know what eventually happens. Hindsight predictability is amplified further by the fact that the public rarely sees or hears about the cases in which the same “warning signs” were present but no bad outcome occurred.

This does not mean that we cannot or should not learn from past events, and use what we learn to do better. We can and we should. But our first priority should be to fix the cracks rather than to stand chest deep in rising water trying to figure out who knew what about the leaking cracks and when they knew it. Knowing that hindsight bias operates for nearly all of us humans, we might also consider being a bit more circumspect in estimating how predictable or foreseeable a particular horrific event may have been.

In that spirit, I’ll offer a few personal thoughts and observations about four possible “take away” insights from the Abdulmutallab and Hasan cases that might be used to help us think about what we might change or do differently to improve our ability to prevent future acts of terrorism.

1. Managing threats may be a greater challenge than identifying them.

After an attack, it seems there is often a reflexive outcry for “more training” to identify persons of concern. Ironically, there are also numerous people simultaneously coming forward to say that they had observed concerning behaviors or inappropriate communications on multiple occasions. Some did not know if their concern was “enough” to prompt an official report, while others will say that they did attempt to report their concerns to others. The after-the-fact collage of evidence begins to assemble.

It is not clear that either Abdulmutallab or Hasan came “from out of the blue” or flew completely under the radar. If that’s true, then the ever-present pursuit of a better “checklist” to identify the next bad guy may be neither necessary nor sufficient to improve prevention. Instead, systems might choose to focus on questions like:

• (1) When people saw or heard behaviors that concerned them, what influenced their decision about whether to report or share their concern with others?
• (2) When concerns were reported to others, how were those assessed and handled and what follow-up occurred?; and
• (3) What might have permitted the array of reported concerns from various sources to be aggregated and accessible to one (or more) authorities with prevention responsibilities?

2. Violent extremism is not always bred in an environment of poverty and deprivation.

Maybe the public has already moved past this assumption. There certainly have been numerous cases in the past 8 years to suggest that terrorism is not necessarily an affliction reserved for the poor and downtrodden. Abdulmutallab and Hasan were both persons of means; the former from a politically prominent and wealthy family and the latter, a trained physician and commissioned officer in the U.S. military. At a national and community-level, there are often good reasons to use economic development and assistance as part of a strategy to make areas less hospitable to extremists. At an individual level, however, poverty as an explanation for terrorism falls terribly short.

3. Social dimensions of violent extremism are absolutely critical.

Notwithstanding recently voiced concerns about a surge of “self-radicalization,” the process of adopting and acting upon a violent extremist ideology is nearly always marked by some degree of social influence. The nature of what is “social” has certainly changed over the past two decades, but interactions with others continue to be important markers on a pathway to terrorist violence.

It is common to think of the “charismatic leader” as the crux of the problem, but the real challenge is probably a bit more complex. A number of folks - Abdulmutallab and Hasan included – seem to have sought, not to have been sought by – the movement leaders with whom they had contact. Those who acted do not appear to have been entranced by charisma, but rather to have been seeking legitimacy, justification, and recognition from others as part of their path forward.

If that’s what you’re looking for, it’s not terribly hard to find; just go (virtually or in person) where there are likeminded others. The intellectual and emotional journey of many nascent militants is not so much driven by the well-informed pursuit of truth as it is by the need for certainty and consistency. This is what being connected to, and surrounded by, others (in a particular region, a training camp, a religious training school or a campus activist group) can provide – encouragement, belonging, and affirmation that they are on the right path.

4. Nothing succeeds like success.

Al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups have been rather successful in building the value of their “brand.” A large part of their post-9/11 success and the diffusion of their ideology comes from the prestige of that brand. AQ franchises have proliferated around the globe and individuals who want to be taken seriously, liberally use the Al-Qa’ida name even when their actual connections may be fairly tenuous. Media reports are sometimes equally loose in identifying Al-Qa’ida “members” and affiliates.

We cannot see inside the minds of Abdulmutallab and Hasan to discern their true motivations for violence. We do know that people are complicated and actions like this typically involve multiple motives operating simultaneously. Many reports also seem to suggest that each struggled at various times to fit in and to be accepted, whatever their financial means or professional accomplishments. If that’s the case, associating oneself with a powerful brand and a widely-feared movement might seem compellingly attractive.

Some researchers and analysts have observed that social movements generally – and militant jihadists specifically – seem to enjoy greater enlistment growth during periods of perceived prominence and operational success. The public and the security communities certainly need to take very seriously the threat posed by militant jihadist terrorists, but we might also be mindful not to inadvertently add equity to Al-Qa’ida’s brand or to create powerful, imposing icons of those claiming to act under its banner.

Radicalization is Not Just About Religion

Radicalization is a process not an event. Adopting a violent extremist ideology is rarely, if ever, “caused” by just one person, place or incident. It is often not even driven by purely religious motives. There are multiple paths that can lead one into terrorism. We need to accept the fact that there is some complexity here if we are going to make any substantial long-term progress in countering violent extremism. Major Nidal Hasan, the alleged Fort Hood shooter and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged Christmas or “Underwear” bomber are both recent reminders that we need to keep working at the problem.

Watch CBS News Videos Online

Quintan Wiktorowicz has done some of the most compelling empirical fieldwork in the study of Islamist radicalization based on dozens of interviews with affiliates of a militant group just outside London, England. He uses the lens of Social Movement Theory to understand the process. He finds that those who came to be radicalized first revealed an openness to new worldviews (cognitive opening), then came to view religion as a path to find meaning (religious seeking), eventually found the group’s narrative and ethos to “make sense” (frame alignment), and ultimately, through a process of socialization, became fully indoctrinated into the movement, and incorporated it as a central feature of their identities (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

Cognitive openness and a “seeker” mindset are very common in young people who are trying to figure out who they are, where they fit, and what ultimately will define them. In a sense, however, it is when they are most vulnerable to ideological influence. When you’re looking for answers, looking to belong, and looking for meaning – and someone comes along with clear-cut absolute answers, shows how you fit among a larger collective, and offers you truth and purpose – it becomes easy to bypass critical thinking.

Sometimes, people develop grievances on their own, then seek likeminded others for affiliation or affirmation. Other times, the political “grievances” of violent extremists are the consequence, rather than the cause of their militant alignment. People may experience personal crises or hardships on their own that increase their vulnerability, but recruiters, spotters, and other influencers need only smell a hint of openness, then they “explain” the individual’s problem as a mere symptom of a larger injustice – one for which violent action against wrongdoers is the “right” and necessary course of action.

In either case, we need to be clear that radicalization typically develops from an interaction between a (often motivated) seeker and inspirational figures within the radical movement. Those who “become radicalized” – in general - are not passive victims of brainwashing or aggressive outreach. The process evolves through social transaction – sometimes on the Internet, other times individually or in small groups – but each is providing something that the other wants.

As the investigations progress, it may turn out to be true that both Hasan and Abdulmutallab had some correspondence with or connection to Yemeni Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki (pictured at right) , but that does not mean that al-Awlaki is the sine qua non of these attacks. Preliminary reports seem to suggest that, if contact did occur, then it was the actors themselves – not al-Awlaki - who did the outreach.

In my next post, I will outline a few key “take-home” messages on understanding radicalization based on what we are learning from the Hasan and Abdulmutallab investigations.

-Randy Borum

Afghanistan Options Made Simple (Though the Choice is Not)

Tomorrow night, in a televised address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Obama will reveal his long-awaited decision on the next steps in Afghanistan.

The U.S. currently has about 68,000 troops on the ground in Afghanistan. Every aspect of US operations there has been subject to intense debate. If there is any consensus to be had in understanding U.S. objectives there, the two stand-outs would probably be:

1. preventing Afghanistan from again being used as a home and safe haven for Al Qaeda; and
2. preventing the hazards of an ungoverned Afghanistan from destabilizing the region, especially Pakistan with its cache of nuclear weapon.

Joanna Gurney from The Truman National Security Project Educational Institute, has put together a presentation called “Afghanistan 101” for those who want a quick overview of the situation. It addresses our goal in Afghanistan; connections between al-Qaeda and the Taliban; US strategy -past and present; the role of Pakistan; and why the President is reconsidering US strategy there.

Here is a glance at the President's main menu of options (according to the NY Times):

Option #1: The Full Monty - 40,000 troops

This is almost as many as Gen. Stanley McChrystal requested. David Kilcullen, one of the chief architects of US COIN doctrine, believes at least 40,000 will be needed.

Under the big option, U.S. troop strength in Kandahar would more than triple. They would more than double in Helmland. And a new infusion would occupy East Afghanistan in the provinces of Paktika, Paktia and Khost (called "P2K"). About 10,000 of the new troops would be deployed primarily to help train and equip the indigenous Afghan Army for an eventual handoff.

Option #2 - The Middle Ground - 20,000 to 35,000 troops

This option is currently the odds-on favorite. This option has the support of heavyweight advisors such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen. Under this plan, there would be half as many military trainers, and much less emphasis on Helmland and P2K. For every 10,000 troops, you can count on a cost of about $10 billion per year.

Kilcullen thinks the middle ground is the worst possible option:

We can either put in enough troops to control the environment or we can credibly communicate our intention to leave. Either could work. Splitting the difference is not the way to go. It feels to me that all these options are dangerously close to the middle ground and we have to consider whether the middle ground is a good place to be. The middle ground is a good place on domestic issues, but not on strategy. You either commit to D-Day and invade the continent or you get Suez. Half-measures end up with Suez. Do it or not do it.

Option #3 - COIN Lite - 10,000 to 15,000 troops

This is Vice President Biden's preferred choice, but most other analysts are pretty skeptical and think the effects would be like putting a Band-Aid on an open chest wound. The rationale for the Lite plan is not to boost combat troop strength, but to focus on training indigenous forces and have more of the trigger-pulling and bad-guy-killing done by the locally unpopular Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones).

Remember the exciting new Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual? Well, if we were to follow the guidance of our own playbook - it would require a surge of more than a half million troops to fit the recommended troop:population ratio.

The Unconsidered Option - Calling it a Day

For a variety of reasons, I suppose, the idea of withdrawal didn't even have a "walk-on's" chance to make the cut. Those who think we should call it a draw and go home are a fairly diverse group, with different motivations.

Robert Jervis, for example, says: "Nothing looks good. ... I’m not convinced that withdrawal is as bad as the conventional wisdom has it. ..I’m really open to be convinced that the consequences are awful. And, of course, like all future, it’s unpredictable, but there are terrorist bases other than in Afghanistan, like in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. And I’m not convinced the Taliban, which of course is not united, would give Al Qaeda an opportunity to consolidate power the way it did in 2001. So unless the U.S. government can come up with a plan that looks to have some sensible prospect, I don’t see the point in sending more troops."

Matthew Hoh, a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and Senior Civilian representative for the US Government in Zabul Province (Afghanistan), in his September letter of resignation said: “To put simply: I fail to see the value or the worth in continued US casualties or expenditures of resources in support of the Afghan government in what is, truly, a 35-year-old civil war.”

Most of the drama surrounding the President's decision is already over before it is even announced. Now, we will have to see how it plays out. Lives and Nations are quite literally at stake.

If Al Qa’ida's in the Market for a New Place, Yemen Looks Like a Nice Neighborhood

Within the next ten years Yemen could either become a serious concern to the US or a success story in proactive intervention, according to CNAS (Center for a New American Security) analysts Andrew Exum and Richard Fontaine. Yemen is a relatively small, impoverished, and politically messy country lying along Saudi Arabia’s southern border and stretching along the Gulf of Aden, just across from the Horn of Africa.

It would be a very dangerous base for transnational terrorist groups and a hazardous spot for instability in an region of great geopolitical importance. The entire world has a stake in not seeing Yemen go to the bad guys.

Over the past year, concern about Yemen’s future has become increasingly widespread. On the human rights front, the UN and the Red Cross are worried that the flood of citizens running to get away from clashes between government forces and Shi'ite rebels (mostly in and around Sa'ada in the North) is drastically overcrowding the aid camps. Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world. There are already nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons from the conflict, and hundreds more are flooding in every day. One family tents are occupied by 3-4 families.

On the political front, the armed conflict is likely to get worse before it get any better. The Northern fighting has started spilling over into Saudi Arabia. That’s bad news for a bunch of reasons. The rebels say that Saudi Arabia has been enabling Yemeni troops, so they took control of a strip of Saudi border territory, leading the Saudi government to launch a counteroffensive. In the South, fighting is more sporadic, but support for secession is beginning to swell.

Al Qa’ida, as usual, is also stirring the pot. They are shouldering up alongside the Yemenis (and Saudis) to quash the Shi'ite rebel threat in the North, while attempting to build their own infrastructure in the South. U.S. military and intelligence officials have confirmed that AQ has recently opened a new training camp housing over 400 fighters in Yemen’s southern Abyan province. Most of the fighters are Yemeni, Saudi, or Somali.

Exum and Fontaine point to three emerging trends in Yemen that may also make for a more volatile climate. First, that Yemen who derives most of its national revenue from taxes on oil production, has been suffering marked declines in petroleum production. So much so that some analysts believe it may fall to zero in the next seven years. And they apparently have no economic back-up plan.

Second, Yemen’s population is expected to double in the next 25 years (but without concurrent economic growth to support it). The nation’s unemployment rate is 40%, and 46% of its 7.4 million primary school age children do not attend school. Many have to work to help support their families. The population is very young – nearly half are under the age of 15. The youth bulge has been a troubling demographic trend in areas of the world – like Yemen- already plagued by problems with violent extremism.

Third, Yemen is about to run out of ground water resources. A huge majority of their water is currently used in agriculture in ways that are highly, highly inefficient. The water crisis will have further detrimental effects on the economy, development, and human security.

Yemen appears to be poised to cultivate a new generation of young people, raised in poverty without job skills or education, knowing only war in their surroundings, to live in an abject economic climate without hope for future opportunity, where even basic life-sustaining resources such as water are scarce, but violent extremism is abundant. That can’t be good. Exum and Fontaine conclude:

This confluence of political, ideological, economic, and environmental forces will render Yemen a fertile ground for the training and recruitment of Islamist militant groups for the foreseeable future.

They believe that the:

United States should implement a comprehensive strategy that marries counterterrorism support, development assistance, diplomatic pressure, and efforts at political reconciliation.

They discuss their strategy in a bit more depth in the full Policy Brief, On the Knife’s Edge: Yemen’s Instability and the Threat to American Interests By Andrew M. Exum and Richard Fontaine.

30 November 2009 - ADDENDUM:

Christian Science Monitor
Ben Hancock

Saudi Arabia said Saturday it has cleared a mountain foothold used by Yemeni rebels along the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, in what appeared to be part of a larger battle against Al Qaeda's expansion.

The rebels, called Houthis, are followers of the Zaidi sect of Shiite Islam, and the Saudis believe both that they have ties to Shiite-dominated Iran and have Al Qaeda members within their ranks. Saudi Arabia fears they may destabilize Yemen, posing a major security threat to the world's largest oil exporter, reports Reuters.

Read the full article HERE.

Monitoring Sudan

Security is Sudan is vital, but remains elusive. The U.S. has become increasingly mindful of the need to monitor social and political situations around the Horn of Africa and to encourage greater stability. Key security interests for U.S. and the global community include buffering the expansion of terrorist safehavens - recall that Sudan graciously hosted Usama bin Laden when he was rejected by the Saudi government - and quelling a legacy of ethnic violence and human rights abuses.

Sudan is a major player in the East African region, but they are not a unified front. The North and South continue to be engaged in a protracted struggle, and to function largely as separate and adversarial political entities. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided a stopgap measure, and set the stage for elections to occur in February 2010. But Southern Sudan is still plagued by very deep challenges that do not provide an environment conducive to legitimate and peaceful elections. There is civil unrest between Southern communities, violent opposition and threat from militia groups, and charges that the North is obstructing the CPA.

With scheduled elections just four months away, Sudan deserves the attention of the global security community. A wonderful source of information is The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Project, a component project of the well-known "Small Arms Survey." I have provided a their project description below and would encourage you to visit the site and perhaps subscribe to their free email alerts.

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a multi-year research project administered by the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, UNMIS, UNDP, and NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collections and security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant guidance on redressing insecurity. The objectives of the project are the following:

* to investigate international, regional, and domestic transfers of arms;
* to assess domestic small arms stockpiles and inventories;
* to map and assess origins, motivations, and distribution of armed groups;
* to measure the scale and distribution of mortality, morbidity, and victimization; and
* to examine local security arrangements and demand for weapons.

The project publishes its findings regularly in two separate formats, Issue Briefs and Working Papers, as well as in occasional op-eds and practitioner articles. Publications are available in English, Arabic and French (in the case of research on the Central African Republic and Chad), and they maintain an excellent listing of Sudan-related web links.

Putting Together the Pieces of Complexity & the Return of Shining Path

How does all this global security & armed conflict stuff fit together?

Let me take a moment to integrate a couple of related snippets previously reported here ("Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict" ) and give a new example of the connections between them.

Just as a quick refresher, we have addressed the following characteristics of the complex terrain that is now our shared global space:

• Criminal gangs are increasingly linking to armed insurgent movements.

• Criminal organizations are increasingly connected to terrorist organizations.

• Terrorist organizations and armed groups are both increasingly engaged in and connected to criminal activity - not just to support political goals.

• Corrupt and totalitarian governments weaken or disregard the rule of law and create environments that make it easy for criminal and subversive activity to flourish and for gross human rights violations to go unchecked.

• Authoritarian state leaders have started to control their populations in increasingly sophisticated ways - not just through violence and intimidation, but also by using technology to manipulate the information space - their own version of a "hearts and minds" campaign.

• Finally, we have seen that drugs generally continue to be the top selling commodity in transnational criminal enterprises. If one is interested in being a major player in the drug trade in a corrupt or lawless region, it helps to have a guy with a gun - or a group of guys with guns - who "got your back." It makes it easier to get the land and facilities you need; to protect those assets from competitors and poachers; to facilitate the trade and safe transport of your product; and to establish your dominance in an environment where everyone is looking for a piece of the action.

Keeping these trends in mind, consider the new Heritage Foundation report: Narco-Terrorism in Peru: The Return of Shining Path by James M. Roberts and Edwar Enrique Escalante. They report that the Shining Path, the Peruvian Maoist/Marxist/Leninist guerrilla group born in the 1960s has made a comeback..with a vengeance. Recent credits include kidnapping, assassination and murder of young Peruvian soldiers.

Surely, you might think, such a group would be feared and despised among its populace. But opting for honey over vinegar, Shining Path has opted to provide some supportive services for "the people" including food, dental care, and even barber services.

Where does a group like Shining Path find the money to support such activities? Right. Cocaine trade and trafficking. They have inserted themselves aggressively into the Capitalist market - albeit an illicit market - that they originally formed to fight against.

And because in a globalized world, borders can be a benefit, rather than an impediment, Shining Path has found tactical allies and kindred spirits among their guerrilla comrades in Columbia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC). Roberts and Escalante also report that the leader of Peru's nationalist party has pushed to get the Peruvian military out of the cocaine-heavy areas of the country. That political leader, by the way, is also wink/nudge pal of Venezuelan neighbor, Hugo Chávez.

So - recalling the global security trends we have outlined over the past couple of weeks - we see where this is going, right? Maybe there is time to salvage the relative stability of the Peruvian democracy before it becomes the region's next narco-state.

How Armed Groups Make Money from Crime

In the latest issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Bilal Saab and Alexandra Taylor look at the different ways in which Colombian armed groups are connected to criminal activity.

Transnational crime poses a daunting economic security problem. The volume of activity, including the $300-500 billion drug trade, accounts for between 2 and 5 % of the global GDP. Pretty remarkable.

That connections exist between armed groups, including guerillas and insurgents, and transnational crime is rather obvious, but how the connections work is a bit more complicated. Some theories suggest that armed political group develop business arrangements with existing criminal organizations. Others, however, suggest that the once-politically motivated groups are themselves morphing into criminal enterprises. To put it simply: some partner with crime specialists, while others develop their own “in-house” capacity.

“One fundamental characteristic, however, distinguishes armed insurgent groups from organized criminals. Participants in organized crime are motivated by the pursuit of profit, while armed insurgent groups use profits from crime as a means to support their political goals. For an armed group to transition into a criminal organization, it would need to supplant its political motivations with a drive to pursue illegal profits.” P. 457

Saab and Taylor analyze these relationships among the major sub-state armed groups in modern Colombia: (1) The loose coalition of paramilitaries previously organized under the recently demobilized Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and (2) what was once one of the largest guerrilla organizations in the world, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC). Both enterprises – the authors suggest – “derive the majority of their revenues from criminal activities, including kidnapping, extortion, and the protection, production, and trafficking of Andean-grown narcotics. However, paramilitary groups and FARC differ in the level and form of their participation in the international drug trade.” (p. 455)

The authors note that “before its demobilization, the AUC developed the ability engage in almost all levels of drug production and trafficking without resorting to alliances with autonomous criminal organizations (p. 463-4).” They established a vertical presence in the drug trade, as they essentially morphed into a criminal enterprise. FARC, on the other hand, controlled a substantial amount of coca, but made some tactical alliances with a several criminal groups to handle the trafficking and distribution, and instead focused their “in-house” criminal infrastructure development to support
kidnapping and extortion.

“Proponents of “in-house” criminality theories persuasively explain why armed groups and organized criminals would generally avoid collaboration. Such interaction is risky and may increase the likelihood of law enforcement surveillance, and generally such groups are likely to regard each other as market competitors and even political opponents, as violent political insurgents and terrorists seek to upset a comfortable status-quo enjoyed by criminal organizations. Despite these drawbacks, and based on the examples of FARC and the AUC, this article suggests two possible reasons why armed groups would choose to form alliances with criminal organizations over developing “in-house” criminal capabilities. First, some criminal activities—like trafficking and distributing narcotics—require resources and networks that are difficult and costly for an armed group to create. Second, the political environment may make certain criminal activities too politically costly for an armed group to be associated with; thus, armed groups may prefer to form short-term agreements with criminal groups and deny that their members take part in such activities.” P. 468

Saab, B., & Taylor, A. (2009). Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32 (6), 455-475 DOI: 10.1080/10576100902892570

Social/Behavioral Science & Security

Throughout the post-industrial era, science and technology have been central to understanding both global security threats and possible solutions. Within the US and across the globe, major scientific organizations have developed Committees and working groups to integrate science with security policy, however, those efforts have focused almost exclusively on physical/life sciences and been applied predominantly to WMD-related threats．

Although high-tech and catastrophic issues maintain their relevance, the contemporary global security environment has increasingly diffused, evolved in complexity, and become more “human.”

The concept of “national security” for the US and of “global security” for the international community have necessarily broadened to adapt to the demands of this new environment. Security no longer centers on a static tension between two large state superpowers.

It must now concern itself with weak and corrupt governments, not just strong ones.

It must contend with non-state actors and violent extremists who pose a more grave and present danger than any single nation.

It must struggle with the fact that genocide and insurgencies are more prominent and more likely than conventional military standoffs, and that transnational criminal enterprises – from drugs to human trafficking – are deeply interconnected with social, economic and political conflicts.

It must confront and account for the reality that global climate change, energy crises, shortages of potable water, poverty and hunger threaten lives and challenge development. And it must appreciate that this diverse array of threats is dynamic and transactive.

The social and behavioral sciences offer theories and findings that might enhance our understanding of security issues, but they also offer a method of systematic inquiry to develop new knowledge.

A Report from the National Research Council (2002) suggests, for example, :

With regard to security concerns, the social sciences could focus on the precise nature of current “threats” to national and global security, including investigations of the culture of terrorist groups and the structure of terrorist networks. In addition, the social sciences could inform us about the difference between Cold War approaches and strategies for coping with biological threats, terrorist attacks, and stateless violence.

There are many ways in which the study of human behavior – at individual and collective levels – can inform policy and provide a platform for a more empirically-informed multidisicplinary science of national and global security.

It is in the long-term interest of the U.S. and the international community to encourage social/behavioral scientists to engage with each other around global security issues and to connect them with the security enterprise.

Accordingly, this blog is designed to serve as a resource for social/behavioral scientists interested in security issues and for security professionals interested in what science has to say about human behavior.