Warthinker’s Digest- December 9, 2011
Warthinker’s Digest is a feature of the Science of
Global Security & Armed Conflict blog that scans the scholarly
literature from academia, government agencies, and major think tanks,
highlighting new reports and documents bearing on the complexity of conflict
and future trends in warfare. A must-read
feature for defense and security strategists from all sectors interested in
developing their “actionable intellect.”
Authors: Louis
Klarevas, Foreign Policy, December 1,
2011
Klarevas examines
the case of Jose Pimentel in New York. Pimentel was nabbed by NYPD while cobbling
together a homemade pipe bomb. Some politicians were quick to offer Pimentel’s
arrest as further alarming evidence of a growing and evolving “homegrown
terrorism” threat from al Qa’ida. Klarevas
questions that assumption, and presents the view that Pimentel is just the latest
addition to a “list of boneheaded jihadist wannabes.” Why
such a harsh accusation?
·
Jose Pimentel launched a website that explicitly
advocated violence against American citizens, along with bomb making instructions. Guess what?
Authorities noticed.
·
Pimentel, like others on Klarevas’ list, were seduced
by the lure of bomb building but found the best they could do was to expend a
lot of effort to create a clunky and not-so-awe-inspiring device that may or
may not function as intended.
·
Although Pimentel posted “how-to” instructions
on his to share his “expertise,” the truth is he had trouble putting one together
himself. He needed help. Fortunately, he found a knowledgeable associate
to assist with the devices…. But his trusty assistant was actually and NYPD
informant. Imagine that.
Examining
the case of Jose Pimentel, one leaves with the impression that if he had used
the time he spent chest-thumping on the interwebs to go outside and find a
large stick, he probably could have done more damage with that than with his
aspirational doomsday device.
Klarevas does
not suggest that we ignore the threat of terrorism, but he does make an
important point about not overstating the homegrown threat. Some of the bumblers on Klarevas’ wannabe
list have tried. Few have
succeeded. He wraps up with one of my
new favorite quotes: “Just to
put this in perspective, more Americans have been killed here at home by contaminated cantaloupe in the past few months than have
been killed by violent Islamic extremists in the past decade!”
You can read the
full article HERE.
Author: Center
on International Cooperation // New York University
The
primary audience for this research paper is the strategic planner in fragile
and conflict-affected states [FCAS], understood broadly as any actor involved
in either the formulation of national priorities to mitigate or recover from
conflict, or the design of international strategies to support such priorities.
The paper explores the tensions and tradeoffs incurred throughout the planning
process on a range of engagement principles, including national ownership,
prioritization, and sequencing. It aims to serve two purposes:
i.
provide a broad concept of key elements of
planning and
ii.
identify key recommendations for engagement as
well as policy and capacity gaps in the international community’s support of
strategic planning processes.
The
first section of the paper offers general considerations related to i. the
tradeoffs and tensions inherent to strategic planning processes in FCAS, and
ii. the challenges and opportunities that planners face, as a means to set the
context and rationale for the guidance and recommendations presented throughout
the paper. The second and third sections discuss the prerequisites for and the
actual steps of the strategic planning process, with a focus on current
practice and its range of tradeoffs and tensions, including challenges in
formulating results for greater accountability and issues related, inter alia,
to ownership, prioritization, and funding. The conclusion presents a summary of
findings, along with key policy recommendations drawn from the analysis and the
case studies, as well as suggested areas where further research could
strengthen the international community’s capacities to support strategic
planning processes. SOURCE: Center on International Cooperation // New York
University // Hosted by Research for Development
You can read the
full report HERE.
Author: Chronic
Poverty Research Centre
Most
so-called civil wars take place in poor countries. Non-war violence is also
prevalent in countries with high levels of poverty. Non-war violence includes
sexual violence, communal riots and pogroms, high urban homicide rates and gang
violence, rural land and labour conflicts, and so on. Such violence is
pervasive not just in the ‘least developed countries’ but also in large middle-income
developing countries with high concentrations of extreme poverty: countries
like Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. This much is clear even
with a fairly narrow, straightforwardly physical definition of violence. This
paper aims to set out the significance of understanding and addressing the
links between violence and extreme poverty. Section 2 discusses the impact of
violent conflict on the poor, and on the very poorest, while Section 3 examines
the contribution of extreme poverty to the causation of violent conflict.
Section 4 draws out conclusions. SOURCE: Chronic Poverty Research Centre
You can read the
full report HERE.
Ten Years of Fragile
States: What Have We Learned?
Author: Laurence
Chandy, Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development
Ten years ago this month, the World Bank established
a taskforce to examine how the development community, and the bank in
particular, should approach fragile states. This project took on special
significance in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, as Western
governments awoke to the threats posed by weak and unstable countries, and
expressed a new willingness to engage with them.
Looking back at the taskforce’s report, there is much that remains salient and even prescient. For instance, the report frames the development agenda for fragile states around a narrow prioritization of reforms, starting with security, stability and the rule of law; emphasizes the attainment of feasible, quick wins; and advocates looking beyond government channels for service delivery. Engagement strategies stress the need for sociopolitical analysis and much deeper forms of donor coordination. Many of these same ideas will, ironically, be presented as new innovations at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea later this month. SOURCE: Brookings Institution
Looking back at the taskforce’s report, there is much that remains salient and even prescient. For instance, the report frames the development agenda for fragile states around a narrow prioritization of reforms, starting with security, stability and the rule of law; emphasizes the attainment of feasible, quick wins; and advocates looking beyond government channels for service delivery. Engagement strategies stress the need for sociopolitical analysis and much deeper forms of donor coordination. Many of these same ideas will, ironically, be presented as new innovations at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea later this month. SOURCE: Brookings Institution
You can read the full report HERE.
Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of “Transcending
Clan Politics”
Author: Ahren Schaefer, Andrew Black
The
Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor
Clan
identity and Islam are central pillars of Somali society, with clan dynamics
and inter-clan rivalries magnified by decades of state collapse. Al-Shabaab -
the dominant Islamist militia controlling much of southern and central Somalia
- claims to “transcend clan politics,” yet reality on the ground belies this
claim, revealing that al-Shabaab seeks to manipulate local clan alliances and
remains deeply influenced by clan politics. This analysis shows that despite
al-Shabaab’s hard-line Islamist identity and pro-al-Qaeda rhetoric, many
aspects of the group’s past and current behavior remain deeply rooted in
Somalia’s local dynamics. Moreover, clan rules apply even to Somalia’s most
feared Islamists. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor
You can read the
full article HERE.
