Transnational Threats Update

The latest update from CSIS' Transnational Threats Project is now available.




Transnational Threats Update November-December 2009
Vol. 7, No. 9

By Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas M. Sanderson
Jan 19, 2010

The Transnational Threats Update is produced by the Transnational Threats Project and provides monthly reports and analysis on terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and arms trafficking.

In this issue:

• Domestic Radicalization Gaining Ground?
• Russian Terrorism
• Saudi Arabia Brings the Heat to Yemen
• Lashkar-e-Taiba Goes Global
• Political Violence in the Philippines
• Thai Authorities Make Arms Trade Bust
• AQIM Runs Drugs to Europe
• Kingpin’s Death Leaves Wake of Violence
• Drone Disaster?
• Did Citibank Get Hacked by the Russian Mafia?

Public Corruption is Afghans’ Greatest Worry

Public Corruption is Afghans’ Greatest Worry

Most Afghans (nearly 60%) say that corruption and public dishonesty is the most prominent problem for the country. More so even than insecurity (54%) and unemployment (52%), according to a UNODC survey of 7,600 Afghans. The results are presented in their new report: Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by Victims.

Here’s the situation, according to UNODC:

• More than half of adult Afghans have had to bribe at least one (but five, on average) public official in the past year.
• Bribery is most pronounced in the North and South (less prevalent in the West), and payments are usually higher (and more ubiquitous) in rural areas.
• Most believe that the situation is getting worse, rather than better, especially in rural areas.
• Police, courts and customs are the public sectors in which bribery occurs most often, where they occur in about half of all citizen transactions.
• Bribes are most commonly exchanged for timely processing of administrative requests, to avoid monetary fines, and to receive preferential treatment.
• Nearly three out of four Afghans (72%) believe it is necessary to bribe an official to receive public service, causing most to lose trust in those services. Many Afghans have even come to believe that many of the International organizations and NGOs present there are mainly motivated to profit off of the people.
• In some circumstances, many have either accepted the practice of bribery or find the practice to be acceptable – particularly for services like expediting a process or preference in hiring someone for a civil service job. Less than 10% have ever reported corruption or a requested bribe, most say that’s because it would be pointless to do so.
• Most Afghans also find that neither tribal leaders nor the media do much to raise awareness or address the problem.

Toward a Criminology of Genocide

In the most recent issue of the journal Theoretical Criminology (November 2009, Volume 13, No. 4 -Sage Publications), a special section is devoted to Criminology's potential contributions to the study and prevention of genocide.

Nicole Rafter of Northeastern University sets the stage for the series of articles that follow. She uses as a platform for the discussion the 2009 book: Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. xxii plus 269 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-51567-2 (hbk), 978-0-521-73135-5 (pbk)}, inviting four scholars of genocide and security issues to review the text and comment on its implications. All four reviewers offer generally positive appraisals, and seem to agree that the book has a strong theoretical and empirical grounding and makes a number of important contributions to the study of genocide. Rafter's lead-in offers the following introduction:

Slowly and belatedly, criminology is incorporating genocide as one of the crimes it can and must try to account for. Many criminologists are, in fact, anxious to include genocide in their theorizing and teaching, but they have lacked an example, a road map to guide them through this difficult terrain. Darfur and the Crime of Genocide offers that guide. To bring it to the attention of other criminologists, I invited four scholars to review the book and assess its potential for the evolving criminology of genocide. The reviews are followed by a response in which John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond react not only to the reviewers, but also to a challenge to the propriety of their attempt to intervene in African politics. In a number of ways, the following contributions mark a milestone in the development of criminological thought. (p. 475)

The first of the four reviews is provided by Joachim J. Savelsberg (Genocide, criminology, and Darfur, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 477-480.) who praises the fact that the authors apply "a sociologically based criminology to genocide scholarship... and impressively link empirical social science with the jurisprudence of genocide." He highlights several key contributions, but particularly notes the merit of their "theory of offending" in genocide, which he summarizes in the following way:

A nutshell version highlights the knowledge-related factors: precipitating conditions, especially (1) land competition and supremacist ideology produce Arab versus Black identities (or socially constructed racial groups) and thereby provide a vocabulary of motives and neutralization; they motivate (2) individualized racial intent (‘race’ as a vocabulary o motive) further promoted by field commanders with high levels of ‘social efficacy’ (as Ross Matsueda puts it) and ties to (and support from) the Sudanese government; and lead, via (3) frenzied collective action in which the yelling of racial epithets produces collectivized racial intent at the meso-level, back to (4) the macro-level with its patterns of a genocidal state as an endogenous system (that is, not explained by long-standing hatred or a defensive reaction to insurgency). (p 478)

The next review comes from Bruce Hoffman, the well-known scholar on extremism and international security (Mobilizing criminology: The boundaries of criminological science and the politics of genocide, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 481-485.). Hoffman describes how the book's authors use and discuss the 2004 Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) as an empirical basis for their arguments. The ADS was a study of 1136 Darfur refugees in UN Displacement Camps, commissioned by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to document the nature and scope of the Darfur atrocities and whether these atrocities should be characterized as a genocide. Hoffman comments specifically on their use of ADS data to derive mortality estimates, and its comparison to estimates from public health surveys :

The authors argue that the survey reflects a ‘criminological’ approach, not a ‘public health’ approach, to violence: unlike public health surveys that primarily emphasize mortality within displacement camps due to disease and living conditions, criminological surveys incorporate full measures of the violence that caused individuals to become refugees. The two methodological approaches reflect contrasting political stances toward humanitarian intervention. Public health approaches refer to displacement as ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’, a term that conceals and neutralizes responsibility for mass violence but facilitates humanitarian access to refugees. Criminological approaches, in contrast, seek to advance a human rights perspective by investigating violence as crime, potentially resulting in decreased access for aid organizations. (p. 483)

The next review by Hadar Aviram, titled: Mass atrocity and criminology (Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 487-493.) offers an over-arching critique, but also highlights a potentially intriguing facet of the book; how it explicates the role of dehumanization in genocidal crimes:

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond also emphasize, through shocking and heartbreaking interview quotes, another dimension of the Darfur horror: the vicious, dehumanizing animus behind the attacks (Ch. 1 and p. 119). This raises the important question of the uniqueness of genocide. Dehumanization of the victim has been acknowledged as a feature that accompanies much ‘regular’ crime, not even just violent crime; it is not a phenomenon unique to genocidal settings, but in this latter context it manifests itself in a particularly chilling way. (p.490)

Next up, Ross L. Matsueda (Toward a new criminology of genocide: theory, method, and politics, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 495-502.) offers support for the discipline of Criminology to turn its attention to the crimes of genocide, but thinks its should perhaps focus more on legal remedies and responses. He also offers some additional theories or viewpoints that might guide the author's sociologically-driven analysis.

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond have convincingly argued for a new criminology of genocide and have provided an exemplary empirical study for the new enterprise. They have shown that, for genocide, it is not enough to examine social disorganization (weak organization against crime), but rather, attention must be paid to organization in favor of crime, as it dynamically unfolds through collective action. Such action is intertwined with conventional organization in complex, historically specific ways. But the criminology of genocide must go further and critically evaluate the limitations of legal responses to genocide, examine the politics behind definitions of genocide, and demystify the political dynamics in which economically dominant nation-states at times seek to manipulate international legal institutions and principles so that their parochial interests are portrayed as the interests of all. (p. 500)

Finally, the book's authors, John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond respond to and comment on the four reviews (Criminology confronts genocide: whose side are you on?
Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 503-511.). They begin with the general assertion that "it's about time" criminology invested in the study of genocide.

It took criminology a long time to address some of its most important topics, for example, white-collar crime. It took criminology even longer to confront its more deadly neglected topics, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Yet as we begin to study genocide it rapidly becomes apparent that our discipline brings a rich array of theories and methods to this crucial task. (p. 503)

They go one to address the critical objections and suggestions raised by each of the reviewers, including some concerns about how and the extent to which they focus on "race" in their analyses.

Race is a complex social construction and there is good reason to ask whether its role in our analysis is essential, or alternatively whether we might assign race too much importance when a discussion of ethnicity instead might better suffice. Matsueda and Hoffman point to the complexity of racial conflicts and Aviram suggests the nuance and legal advantage of a focus on ethnicity, while Savelsberg reminds us that the way we apply a concept such as race in the social and legal analysis of genocide can have profound implications for the collective memory of groups involved in the conflict. (p.506)

They also acknowledge how focusing on race and focusing on ethnicity can have different implications for analyzing genocide:

We also think it is important to consider the contrasting implications of applying the concepts of ethnicity and race in Darfur. The concept of ethnicity tends to be more pluralistic than the binary construction of race, while ethnicity also incorporates more self-imposed as contrasted with other-imposed designations than race. The concept of ethnicity therefore can be more complex and subjective in its understanding, while conceptions of race can be more rigidly and narrowly socially constructed. However, we argue that it is precisely the simplification, rigidity, and narrowness involved in deadly applications of social constructions of race during mass atrocity that can be especially important in explaining the resulting genocide, and we argue this can be especially well demonstrated using the Chad survey of Darfur’s refugees – a historic survey of genocide as it happened in ‘real time’ in Africa. (p.506-507)

They conclude with the following:

Criminology should not wait to confront genocide in the full depth and breadth of all its scholarly, legal, and moral dimensions. (p.510)

Genocide, of course, is only one of the potential areas of security-related scholarship that might benefit from criminology's attention. Another article in the same issue of the Journal deals with the issue of torture and coercive interrogation (Michael Welch, American ‘pain-ology’ in the war on terror: a critique of ‘scientific’ torture , Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 451-474). Though the principal aim of that article is to debunk and critique the use of social and behavioral science research to justify these coercive techniques, the most comprehensive analysis of that research literature to date (Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art -Foundations for the Future) is not even cited and only cursorily mentioned once as an aside.

Criminology does, indeed, have much to offer to understanding and addressing National/International Security issues. It is encouraging to see some of them beginning to be addressed in the pages of its peer-reviewed journals.

Rafter, N. (2009). Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond: a symposium: Introduction Theoretical Criminology, 13 (4), 475-475 DOI: 10.1177/1362480609345440

Corruption, Inc - Worldwide Rankings

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, according to Transparency International (TI), a non-partisan, global civil society organization founded in 1993 that opposes corruption, and works to facilitate a peaceful worldwide coalition aimed at ending corruption’s devastating effects around the world.

TI believes that corruption has dire global consequences, trapping millions in poverty and misery and breeding social, economic and political unrest by undermining democracy and the rule of law; distorting national and international trade; and threatening the security and sustainability of natural resources.

TI has a useful array of policy products and publications available, two of which I will mention specifically here:

Global Corruption Barometer 2009 (published in English, French, Spanish) presents the main findings of a public opinion survey exploring the general public’s views of corruption, as well as experiences of bribery around the world. It assesses the extent to which key institutions and public services are perceived to be corrupt, measures citizens’ views on government efforts to fight corruption, and this year, for the first time, includes questions about the level of state capture and people’s willingness to pay a premium for clean corporate behavior.

The 2009 Global Corruption Barometer survey interviewed 73,132 people in 69 countries and territories between October 2008 and February 2009. The main findings were:

• Corruption in and by the private sector is of growing concern to the general public
• Political parties and the civil service are perceived on average to be the most corrupt sectors around the world
• Experience of petty bribery is reported to be growing in some parts of the world – with the police the most likely recipients of bribes
• Ordinary people do not feel empowered to speak out about corruption
• Governments are considered to be ineffective in the fight against corruption – a view that has remained worryingly consistent in most countries over time

The Global Corruption Barometer is designed to complement the expert opinions on public sector corruption provided by the second of TI’s flagship publications, the Corruption Perceptions Index.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. The CPI is a "survey of surveys", based on 13 different expert and business surveys. It ranks the countries on a common metric (with 90% confidence intervals), which indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

So - quick check of your corruption perceptions. Which countries on the following list would you rank among 180 nations worldwide as being in the Top 5 Most Corrupt (indicated by a higher number ranking) and Top 5 Least Corrupt (indicated by a lower number ranking)?

• Singapore
• Myanmar
• United States
• Somalia
• Afghanistan
• New Zealand

According to the 2009 CPI, the countries perceived as least corrupt are:

• 1 - New Zealand
• 2 - Denmark
• 3 - Singapore
• 3 (tie)- Sweden
• 5 - Switzerland

According to the 2009 CPI, the countries perceived as most corrupt are:

• 176- Iraq
• 176 (tie) - Sudan
• 178 - Myanmar
• 179 – Afghanistan
• 180 – Somalia

The United States and the United Kingdom are definitely toward the "less corrupt" end of the continuum, but neither leads the way. Some other country rankings you may be wondering about:

• US - #17
• UK - #19
• Brazil - #75
• China - #79
• India - #84
• Russia - #146
• Venezuela - #162
• Iran - #168

Murder Capital of the World??

Which of the following Latin American countries has the highest murder rate?

a. Nicaragua
b. Mexico
c. Venezuela
d. Jamaica

If you answered "Mexico", you made a very reasonable choice. In the past year, violence has been so rampant there that murder numbers have often exceeded 100 per week. But Mexico does not have the worst problem in the region - that distinction goes to .... Venezuela. Venezuela's rate of 48 violent deaths per 100,000 people is double that of Mexico.

Now, if asked instead to name the top-spot for homicide in all South America, surely drug-crime-ravaged Columbia would come readily to mind. But Venezuela's murder stats soar above Columbia's as well.

Shannon O'Neil - a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations - provides some details on the plight of this troubled nation - that sits in a troubled region where murder rates are triple the global average.

According to O'Neil:

• These murders occur mostly at night and spike every two weeks around payday.

• Young people are increasingly the victims, three times more likely to be killed today than 10 years ago.

• Not surprisingly, Venezuelans see crime and public safety as the No. 1 challenge for their country.

Why Venezuela?

O'Neil points out there that there is no single cause, but a convergence of problems that have taken their toll, particularly during Hugo Chávez's tenure over the past decade. Some of it seems related to Chávez's own brand of leadership - openly accusing public figures of criminal activity and condoning violence against anti-government protesters. Loyalty to Chávez trumps the law. Trust in the legitimacy of major state institutions is virtually nonexistent. Other causes include the following:

• Venezuela has become the new "Grand Central" of Andean cocaine traffic, and perhaps even the prime transit point for European shipment.

• Though Chávez replaced local police with a National force, law enforcement still lacks capacity - in skill, personnel or equipment - and often motivation to properly investigate the serious crimes they now face. Officers have no confidence that justice will prevail in the system, and they not uncommonly treat offenders with brutality.

• Policing has also become politicized, with pressure not to lean too heavily on the poor working-class communities. But this creates pervasive disorder.

• The justice system is weak and dysfunctional, undermining the rule of law. Most Venezuelans believe that the police are involved in a lot of the crimes. So - no surprise - crime doesn't even get reported. Courts are perceived as unjust - sentencing only 3 of every hundred murderers.

Genocide: Criminological and CJ Perspectives

The June, 2009 issue of International Criminal Justice Review is a special issue devoted to genocide (defined here as the mass murder of people based on a specific agenda). It is guest edited by Professor John Winterdyk, who also serves as the outgoing chair (2009) of the International Section for the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS). In his Introduction to the special issue, Professor Winterdyk notes that: "this is the first time a mainstream criminology/criminal justice journal has dedicated an entire issue to the subject of genocide."

He begins by tracing the history of interest (or absence of interest) in genocide among criminal justice scholars, sharing the regret expressed by Day and Vandiver (2000) “that criminology, by largely ignoring the crime of genocide, has missed opportunities to both contribute to the field of genocide studies and to improve the specification of its own ideas” (p. 43). George Yacoubian examined papers presented at meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) and ACJS as well as major criminology journals between 1990 and 1998, finding the topic of genocide to be all but absent from the agenda. A re-examination of ASC and ACJS conferences since 2000 shows a similar trend.

A key objective among the authors in organizing this special issue is "to promote and encourage the study of genocide by criminologists and other scholars by publishing theoretical and empirical studies of genocide."

His introduction briefly reviews the scope of genocide's global importance and challenge, citing data to show that throughout history - including in the 20th Century, the number of deaths from genocide have dramatically outpaced deaths resulting from war. He reviews some of the major international definitions and describes how the field of genocide studies has gown in other disciplines and academic sectors.

He concludes with a synopsis of each of the six articles comprising the special issue, offering his hope that they show "there is considerable work that can be done by academics within criminology and criminal justice to help address and ameliorate genocide from happening in the future."

Winterdyk, J. (2009). Genocide: International Issues and Perspectives Worthy of Criminal Justice Attention International Criminal Justice Review, 19 (2), 101-114 DOI: 10.1177/1057567709334217