Internally Displaced Persons in 2010

Human displacement is one of the tragic – but often less visible- consequences of pervasive armed conflict. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) released its latest report, titled: Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010. At the UN’s request, the Norwegian Refugee Council established the IDMC in 1998. Since then, it has become the leading monitor of internal displacement around the world. Here are just a few highlight from the 2010 Report:

• The number of IDPs globally rose from the end of 2009 to reach 27.5 million.
• Perhaps not surprisingly, Africa – as a region – has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. There are more than 11 million IDPs on the continent and highly concentrated in Sudan, accounting for about 40% of the world total.
• New displacements in Yemen boosted the figures for the Middle East region, which reached 3.9 million at the end of 2010.
• By individual country, Colombia, Sudan, Iraq, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Somalia each reported more than a million IDPs. Although humanitarian and development agencies tend to focus on rural IDPs in rural areas, in most countries, significant numbers are also living in urban areas
• People from a minority group were at greater risk displacement and had less access to formal and informal support and security/protection.
• Attacks or threats against humanitarian workers continued in many situations including Darfur in Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and Colombia.

You can read the full report HERE.

Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, and Anti-Capitalism: Strange Bedfellows?

While much of the world is just now coming to grips with the demise of the old "superpower" system, a confluence of emerging ideologies and population-influence tactics are waiting eagerly in the wings.

Last year, the folks from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia published a report titled "Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians," which looked at new ways that totalitarian-like leaders are squelching political freedoms throughout the world through strategic use of media (including social media) and participating in the global marketplace of ideas.

In a number of countries, leaders have ascended not so much with heavy-handed military might, but by using economic, social and political mechanisms to gain international legitimacy and foreign aid. They are not fighting the game; they are playing the game. They are not struggling against democracy, but rather, redefining it to suit their own ambitions.

Undermining Democracy described changes in how authoritarians are doing business, but what about possible changes in the causes theselves - the underlying totalitarian ideologies?

This is precisely what Ernest Sternberg addresses in his latest article: Purifying the World: What the New Radical Ideology Stands For, published in Orbis.

Sternberg coins the term "world purificationism" to characterize this diverse and somewhat diffuse ethos that is more easily identified by what it opposes (imperialist capitalism) than by what it advocates. He identifies "world purificationism" as a social movement whose idealistic vision is the following:

the anticipated defeat of imperial capitalist power in favor of a global network of beneficent culture-communities, which will empower themselves through grassroots participatory democracy, and maintain consistency across movements through the rectifying power of NGOs, thereby bringing into being a new era of global social justice and sustainable development, in which the diverse communities can harmoniously share an earth that has been saved from destruction and remade pristine. (p.65)

That's right. The ideological centerpieces are global justice, environmental protection and economic sustainability. Could it be that the traditionally liberal earth-lovers and environmental evangelists (who Sternberg says "like the followers of totalitarianisms past, .. also see themselves as the vanguard for the highest humanitarian ideals... {and as} exemplars of purity, {and} as progenitors of the utmost in democracy and inter-cultural appreciation") are morphing into a totalitarian social movement? Or perhaps just that they have become willing to permit totalitarianism as a tactic in order to prevent the earth's apocalyptic self-destruction? Are the "disaffected and alienated" being targeted for mobilization against the capitalist powers?

It seems in many ways reminiscent of modern anarchist movement: cohering around common enemies, defining themselves primarily by what they oppose, lacking hierarchical organization, bristling against state-level power, pro-environment, and anti-capitalism.

Sternberg's article is worth a read and the evolving processes of this emerging movement are certainly worth our attention.

Sternberg, E. (2010). Purifying the World: What the New Radical Ideology Stands For Orbis, 54 (1), 61-86 DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.10.006

Public Corruption is Afghans’ Greatest Worry

Public Corruption is Afghans’ Greatest Worry

Most Afghans (nearly 60%) say that corruption and public dishonesty is the most prominent problem for the country. More so even than insecurity (54%) and unemployment (52%), according to a UNODC survey of 7,600 Afghans. The results are presented in their new report: Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by Victims.

Here’s the situation, according to UNODC:

• More than half of adult Afghans have had to bribe at least one (but five, on average) public official in the past year.
• Bribery is most pronounced in the North and South (less prevalent in the West), and payments are usually higher (and more ubiquitous) in rural areas.
• Most believe that the situation is getting worse, rather than better, especially in rural areas.
• Police, courts and customs are the public sectors in which bribery occurs most often, where they occur in about half of all citizen transactions.
• Bribes are most commonly exchanged for timely processing of administrative requests, to avoid monetary fines, and to receive preferential treatment.
• Nearly three out of four Afghans (72%) believe it is necessary to bribe an official to receive public service, causing most to lose trust in those services. Many Afghans have even come to believe that many of the International organizations and NGOs present there are mainly motivated to profit off of the people.
• In some circumstances, many have either accepted the practice of bribery or find the practice to be acceptable – particularly for services like expediting a process or preference in hiring someone for a civil service job. Less than 10% have ever reported corruption or a requested bribe, most say that’s because it would be pointless to do so.
• Most Afghans also find that neither tribal leaders nor the media do much to raise awareness or address the problem.

The Future of Human Security

The Future of Human Security

Human Security is often defined by two of FDR’s “four freedoms”: (1) Freedom from fear and (2) Freedom from want. Threats to those freedoms and the nature of their effects are as fluid and dynamic as everything else in our global security environment.

Dr. Charli Carpenter, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at UMass-Amherst (and “Duck of Minerva” maven), and her research team have been working to understand why some of these threats make their way onto the advocacy agenda, while others do not. Their work on transnational agenda setting is supported by funding from the National Science Foundation.

In the Summer of 2008, they asked the following question to about 6,000 Human Security advocates:

Name three or more specific issues that come to your mind when you think of human security today. An issue means something that human security specialists are actively concerned about.

Using the cloud-like visual display so popular these days, the results looked something like this, where the size of the word corresponds to the frequency with which the issue was mentioned:

Carpenter and her colleagues have recently completed a follow-up study using six focus groups with people around the world who are active in the Human Security network. With an eye to the future, they asked the focus group participants:

Which important global social problems in these thematic clusters had received too little attention by human security professionals to date?

The top 12 answers were as follows:

1. Opthalmic Care in Developing Countries.
2. Gangs. Going beyond the traditional concern about terrorist and insurgent groups, there is a growing threat from local-level, nonstate armed groups that compete with one another, and challenge state sovereignty and governance.
3. Indigenous Land Rights. Many participants suggested this issue will become even more prominent with the advent of forthcoming initiatives to mitigate effects of climate change.
4. Space Security. Concerns both about orbital debris and the possibility of new spaces extra-global spaces for human occupation. Can you say “lunar colony”?
5. Role of Diasporas in Conflict Prevention. In particular, the impact of outsiders, particularly diasporas, in intractable conflicts worldwide.
6. Workers' Right to Organize.
7. Waste Governance. We all know that “S*** rolls downhill” and apparently in developing areas it comes to rest nearer to the population than one would like, creating a myriad of health and environmental problems. As Dr. Carpenter says: “It's not sexy like climate change but it’s a significant environmental issue for billions of people worldwide.”
8. Sexual Orientation Persecution.
9. Water. Sometimes referred to as “Blue Gold,” the important of usable water has been on the Human Security radar from quite some time, but is viewed as an increasingly pressing concern for development, health, and perhaps for armed conflict.
10. Familization of Governance. Not only “Ol’ Boy” networks but “Ol’ Family” networks tend to dominate politics in many areas of the world, which hampers efforts at political reform and impedes initiatives to reduce corruption.
11. International Voting Rights. Participant advocates spoke for a need beyond promoting state-level democratic processes and institutions, to highlight more specifically need for international or global representation
12. Impunity for Death by Neglect. The notion here is that states ought be held more accountable for deaths resulting from governmental neglect (such as the 11 million children under five who die from preventable diseases each year), not just for those resulting from intentional acts of state violence.

Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, & Iran: The Importance of Connections

Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, & Iran: The Importance of Connections

Fighting continues in the Northwest between Yemeni government-backed forces (also supported by Saudi forces) and Yemeni Shi’a insurgents, led by the al-Houthi clan. The area around Sa'ada has been the major hot spot, and apparently allegiances in the local area are divided. Often these splits occur along tribal lines. The militants want to lay claim to an area – beyond the reach of the Yemeni government – where they can practice religion and promulgate official doctrine in a manner of their choosing.

This off-and-on struggle has endured for at least the past 5 years, but this is about as bad as it’s ever been. It has produced nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) so far. Some are fleeing Southward … where al-Qa’ida has recently renovated its terrorist-training franchise.

So - there are a number of inter-related problems here that reach far beyond Yemen itself. Here’s a quick glimpse:

If You Push Them, They Will Come… To Al-Qa’ida:

Violent extremists across the globe, particularly in the past decade, have increasingly deployed service-oriented diplomacy in their recruitment efforts. This approach has been wildly successful for Hizb’allah . They penetrate ungoverned spaces, set up social services (from medical clinics to core infrastructure) that local government lacks capacity or willingness to provide, and they build goodwill by taking on the role of “provider.” In some areas, they have so much control that they function like a proxy government, even collecting taxes from the citizens. When your young child is dying and your government shrugs its shoulders, and someone is there offering to help – that someone looks like a friend for life. That’s the plan. Now, hundreds of thousands of refugees are running away from their government in the Northwest and into Southern regions, which are heavily influenced by al-Qa’ida. If AQ becomes the port in the storm, we can plan to watch as the recruit tally steadily rises.

Yemen May Not Be a Gem, But It Might Be Kind of a Big Deal:

The neighborhood is a significant part of the challenge here. Not only are IDPs flocking to Southwest Yemen from the North, but they are coming just as steadily from across the pond in Somalia – a nation with its own set of governance and Islamist militancy troubles. A significant number of the recruits in AQ’s new South Yemen training campus are Somali. Southwest Yemen and Northeast Somalia lie directly across the Gulf of Aden from each other. That interstitial space – heavily plagued right now by Somali-based pirates – is a major shipping portal. One does not enter the Red Sea, except through that gateway. Nor can West-Coast Saudi Maritime traffic enter the Gulf of Aden except through that gateway. Piracy, pervasive but not yet highly organized off Somalia’s coast, has already cost millions of dollars. If an AQ/Shabaab coalition boosted the effort, it’s probably fair to say that would not help the World economy.

Saudi Arabia and Iran Both Have Dogs in the Fight:

Because the Houthi-affiliated militants several weeks ago stepped across the line into Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom launched a counteroffensive to push them back (and to support Yemen’s government-backed forces). Some in Yemen say this has added fuel to the insurgency, because even more are ready to fight against the Saudis than to fight for the Houthis. Saudi presence and activity lingers in NW Yemen, much to the dismay of Iran. Iran is still a bit miffed that 3-4 years ago the Saudi’s also stuck their nose in an international dispute when Israel launched a major offensive against Hizb’allah. Saudi supported Israel – and it’s probably no secret that there is some affinity between Hizb’allah and Iran. ‘Nuff said. Yemen, in fact, claims that Iran is now supporting the Houthi-affiliated insurgency, and that they (and also Hizb’allah) have been the main source for militant training. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center also thinks that Africa - East Africa in particular - is an important target for Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s ambitious foreign policy. Though most analysts see no major worry for a full-scale proxy war, having Saudi Arabia and Iran both join in the game - and on opposing sides - is -- let’s say “unlikely to facilitate regional peace.”

The concern here is clearly about more than two terribly impoverished, and under-governed countries. The current human rights challenges facing this area are certainly significant, but the economic and global security stakes may ultimately be even higher.

-Randy Borum

Toward a Criminology of Genocide

In the most recent issue of the journal Theoretical Criminology (November 2009, Volume 13, No. 4 -Sage Publications), a special section is devoted to Criminology's potential contributions to the study and prevention of genocide.

Nicole Rafter of Northeastern University sets the stage for the series of articles that follow. She uses as a platform for the discussion the 2009 book: Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. xxii plus 269 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-51567-2 (hbk), 978-0-521-73135-5 (pbk)}, inviting four scholars of genocide and security issues to review the text and comment on its implications. All four reviewers offer generally positive appraisals, and seem to agree that the book has a strong theoretical and empirical grounding and makes a number of important contributions to the study of genocide. Rafter's lead-in offers the following introduction:

Slowly and belatedly, criminology is incorporating genocide as one of the crimes it can and must try to account for. Many criminologists are, in fact, anxious to include genocide in their theorizing and teaching, but they have lacked an example, a road map to guide them through this difficult terrain. Darfur and the Crime of Genocide offers that guide. To bring it to the attention of other criminologists, I invited four scholars to review the book and assess its potential for the evolving criminology of genocide. The reviews are followed by a response in which John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond react not only to the reviewers, but also to a challenge to the propriety of their attempt to intervene in African politics. In a number of ways, the following contributions mark a milestone in the development of criminological thought. (p. 475)

The first of the four reviews is provided by Joachim J. Savelsberg (Genocide, criminology, and Darfur, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 477-480.) who praises the fact that the authors apply "a sociologically based criminology to genocide scholarship... and impressively link empirical social science with the jurisprudence of genocide." He highlights several key contributions, but particularly notes the merit of their "theory of offending" in genocide, which he summarizes in the following way:

A nutshell version highlights the knowledge-related factors: precipitating conditions, especially (1) land competition and supremacist ideology produce Arab versus Black identities (or socially constructed racial groups) and thereby provide a vocabulary of motives and neutralization; they motivate (2) individualized racial intent (‘race’ as a vocabulary o motive) further promoted by field commanders with high levels of ‘social efficacy’ (as Ross Matsueda puts it) and ties to (and support from) the Sudanese government; and lead, via (3) frenzied collective action in which the yelling of racial epithets produces collectivized racial intent at the meso-level, back to (4) the macro-level with its patterns of a genocidal state as an endogenous system (that is, not explained by long-standing hatred or a defensive reaction to insurgency). (p 478)

The next review comes from Bruce Hoffman, the well-known scholar on extremism and international security (Mobilizing criminology: The boundaries of criminological science and the politics of genocide, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 481-485.). Hoffman describes how the book's authors use and discuss the 2004 Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) as an empirical basis for their arguments. The ADS was a study of 1136 Darfur refugees in UN Displacement Camps, commissioned by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to document the nature and scope of the Darfur atrocities and whether these atrocities should be characterized as a genocide. Hoffman comments specifically on their use of ADS data to derive mortality estimates, and its comparison to estimates from public health surveys :

The authors argue that the survey reflects a ‘criminological’ approach, not a ‘public health’ approach, to violence: unlike public health surveys that primarily emphasize mortality within displacement camps due to disease and living conditions, criminological surveys incorporate full measures of the violence that caused individuals to become refugees. The two methodological approaches reflect contrasting political stances toward humanitarian intervention. Public health approaches refer to displacement as ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’, a term that conceals and neutralizes responsibility for mass violence but facilitates humanitarian access to refugees. Criminological approaches, in contrast, seek to advance a human rights perspective by investigating violence as crime, potentially resulting in decreased access for aid organizations. (p. 483)

The next review by Hadar Aviram, titled: Mass atrocity and criminology (Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 487-493.) offers an over-arching critique, but also highlights a potentially intriguing facet of the book; how it explicates the role of dehumanization in genocidal crimes:

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond also emphasize, through shocking and heartbreaking interview quotes, another dimension of the Darfur horror: the vicious, dehumanizing animus behind the attacks (Ch. 1 and p. 119). This raises the important question of the uniqueness of genocide. Dehumanization of the victim has been acknowledged as a feature that accompanies much ‘regular’ crime, not even just violent crime; it is not a phenomenon unique to genocidal settings, but in this latter context it manifests itself in a particularly chilling way. (p.490)

Next up, Ross L. Matsueda (Toward a new criminology of genocide: theory, method, and politics, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 495-502.) offers support for the discipline of Criminology to turn its attention to the crimes of genocide, but thinks its should perhaps focus more on legal remedies and responses. He also offers some additional theories or viewpoints that might guide the author's sociologically-driven analysis.

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond have convincingly argued for a new criminology of genocide and have provided an exemplary empirical study for the new enterprise. They have shown that, for genocide, it is not enough to examine social disorganization (weak organization against crime), but rather, attention must be paid to organization in favor of crime, as it dynamically unfolds through collective action. Such action is intertwined with conventional organization in complex, historically specific ways. But the criminology of genocide must go further and critically evaluate the limitations of legal responses to genocide, examine the politics behind definitions of genocide, and demystify the political dynamics in which economically dominant nation-states at times seek to manipulate international legal institutions and principles so that their parochial interests are portrayed as the interests of all. (p. 500)

Finally, the book's authors, John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond respond to and comment on the four reviews (Criminology confronts genocide: whose side are you on?
Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 503-511.). They begin with the general assertion that "it's about time" criminology invested in the study of genocide.

It took criminology a long time to address some of its most important topics, for example, white-collar crime. It took criminology even longer to confront its more deadly neglected topics, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Yet as we begin to study genocide it rapidly becomes apparent that our discipline brings a rich array of theories and methods to this crucial task. (p. 503)

They go one to address the critical objections and suggestions raised by each of the reviewers, including some concerns about how and the extent to which they focus on "race" in their analyses.

Race is a complex social construction and there is good reason to ask whether its role in our analysis is essential, or alternatively whether we might assign race too much importance when a discussion of ethnicity instead might better suffice. Matsueda and Hoffman point to the complexity of racial conflicts and Aviram suggests the nuance and legal advantage of a focus on ethnicity, while Savelsberg reminds us that the way we apply a concept such as race in the social and legal analysis of genocide can have profound implications for the collective memory of groups involved in the conflict. (p.506)

They also acknowledge how focusing on race and focusing on ethnicity can have different implications for analyzing genocide:

We also think it is important to consider the contrasting implications of applying the concepts of ethnicity and race in Darfur. The concept of ethnicity tends to be more pluralistic than the binary construction of race, while ethnicity also incorporates more self-imposed as contrasted with other-imposed designations than race. The concept of ethnicity therefore can be more complex and subjective in its understanding, while conceptions of race can be more rigidly and narrowly socially constructed. However, we argue that it is precisely the simplification, rigidity, and narrowness involved in deadly applications of social constructions of race during mass atrocity that can be especially important in explaining the resulting genocide, and we argue this can be especially well demonstrated using the Chad survey of Darfur’s refugees – a historic survey of genocide as it happened in ‘real time’ in Africa. (p.506-507)

They conclude with the following:

Criminology should not wait to confront genocide in the full depth and breadth of all its scholarly, legal, and moral dimensions. (p.510)

Genocide, of course, is only one of the potential areas of security-related scholarship that might benefit from criminology's attention. Another article in the same issue of the Journal deals with the issue of torture and coercive interrogation (Michael Welch, American ‘pain-ology’ in the war on terror: a critique of ‘scientific’ torture , Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 451-474). Though the principal aim of that article is to debunk and critique the use of social and behavioral science research to justify these coercive techniques, the most comprehensive analysis of that research literature to date (Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art -Foundations for the Future) is not even cited and only cursorily mentioned once as an aside.

Criminology does, indeed, have much to offer to understanding and addressing National/International Security issues. It is encouraging to see some of them beginning to be addressed in the pages of its peer-reviewed journals.

Rafter, N. (2009). Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond: a symposium: Introduction Theoretical Criminology, 13 (4), 475-475 DOI: 10.1177/1362480609345440

If Al Qa’ida's in the Market for a New Place, Yemen Looks Like a Nice Neighborhood

Within the next ten years Yemen could either become a serious concern to the US or a success story in proactive intervention, according to CNAS (Center for a New American Security) analysts Andrew Exum and Richard Fontaine. Yemen is a relatively small, impoverished, and politically messy country lying along Saudi Arabia’s southern border and stretching along the Gulf of Aden, just across from the Horn of Africa.

It would be a very dangerous base for transnational terrorist groups and a hazardous spot for instability in an region of great geopolitical importance. The entire world has a stake in not seeing Yemen go to the bad guys.

Over the past year, concern about Yemen’s future has become increasingly widespread. On the human rights front, the UN and the Red Cross are worried that the flood of citizens running to get away from clashes between government forces and Shi'ite rebels (mostly in and around Sa'ada in the North) is drastically overcrowding the aid camps. Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world. There are already nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons from the conflict, and hundreds more are flooding in every day. One family tents are occupied by 3-4 families.

On the political front, the armed conflict is likely to get worse before it get any better. The Northern fighting has started spilling over into Saudi Arabia. That’s bad news for a bunch of reasons. The rebels say that Saudi Arabia has been enabling Yemeni troops, so they took control of a strip of Saudi border territory, leading the Saudi government to launch a counteroffensive. In the South, fighting is more sporadic, but support for secession is beginning to swell.

Al Qa’ida, as usual, is also stirring the pot. They are shouldering up alongside the Yemenis (and Saudis) to quash the Shi'ite rebel threat in the North, while attempting to build their own infrastructure in the South. U.S. military and intelligence officials have confirmed that AQ has recently opened a new training camp housing over 400 fighters in Yemen’s southern Abyan province. Most of the fighters are Yemeni, Saudi, or Somali.

Exum and Fontaine point to three emerging trends in Yemen that may also make for a more volatile climate. First, that Yemen who derives most of its national revenue from taxes on oil production, has been suffering marked declines in petroleum production. So much so that some analysts believe it may fall to zero in the next seven years. And they apparently have no economic back-up plan.

Second, Yemen’s population is expected to double in the next 25 years (but without concurrent economic growth to support it). The nation’s unemployment rate is 40%, and 46% of its 7.4 million primary school age children do not attend school. Many have to work to help support their families. The population is very young – nearly half are under the age of 15. The youth bulge has been a troubling demographic trend in areas of the world – like Yemen- already plagued by problems with violent extremism.

Third, Yemen is about to run out of ground water resources. A huge majority of their water is currently used in agriculture in ways that are highly, highly inefficient. The water crisis will have further detrimental effects on the economy, development, and human security.

Yemen appears to be poised to cultivate a new generation of young people, raised in poverty without job skills or education, knowing only war in their surroundings, to live in an abject economic climate without hope for future opportunity, where even basic life-sustaining resources such as water are scarce, but violent extremism is abundant. That can’t be good. Exum and Fontaine conclude:

This confluence of political, ideological, economic, and environmental forces will render Yemen a fertile ground for the training and recruitment of Islamist militant groups for the foreseeable future.

They believe that the:

United States should implement a comprehensive strategy that marries counterterrorism support, development assistance, diplomatic pressure, and efforts at political reconciliation.

They discuss their strategy in a bit more depth in the full Policy Brief, On the Knife’s Edge: Yemen’s Instability and the Threat to American Interests By Andrew M. Exum and Richard Fontaine.

30 November 2009 - ADDENDUM:

Christian Science Monitor
Ben Hancock

Saudi Arabia said Saturday it has cleared a mountain foothold used by Yemeni rebels along the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, in what appeared to be part of a larger battle against Al Qaeda's expansion.

The rebels, called Houthis, are followers of the Zaidi sect of Shiite Islam, and the Saudis believe both that they have ties to Shiite-dominated Iran and have Al Qaeda members within their ranks. Saudi Arabia fears they may destabilize Yemen, posing a major security threat to the world's largest oil exporter, reports Reuters.

Read the full article HERE.

Corruption, Inc - Worldwide Rankings

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, according to Transparency International (TI), a non-partisan, global civil society organization founded in 1993 that opposes corruption, and works to facilitate a peaceful worldwide coalition aimed at ending corruption’s devastating effects around the world.

TI believes that corruption has dire global consequences, trapping millions in poverty and misery and breeding social, economic and political unrest by undermining democracy and the rule of law; distorting national and international trade; and threatening the security and sustainability of natural resources.

TI has a useful array of policy products and publications available, two of which I will mention specifically here:

Global Corruption Barometer 2009 (published in English, French, Spanish) presents the main findings of a public opinion survey exploring the general public’s views of corruption, as well as experiences of bribery around the world. It assesses the extent to which key institutions and public services are perceived to be corrupt, measures citizens’ views on government efforts to fight corruption, and this year, for the first time, includes questions about the level of state capture and people’s willingness to pay a premium for clean corporate behavior.

The 2009 Global Corruption Barometer survey interviewed 73,132 people in 69 countries and territories between October 2008 and February 2009. The main findings were:

• Corruption in and by the private sector is of growing concern to the general public
• Political parties and the civil service are perceived on average to be the most corrupt sectors around the world
• Experience of petty bribery is reported to be growing in some parts of the world – with the police the most likely recipients of bribes
• Ordinary people do not feel empowered to speak out about corruption
• Governments are considered to be ineffective in the fight against corruption – a view that has remained worryingly consistent in most countries over time

The Global Corruption Barometer is designed to complement the expert opinions on public sector corruption provided by the second of TI’s flagship publications, the Corruption Perceptions Index.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. The CPI is a "survey of surveys", based on 13 different expert and business surveys. It ranks the countries on a common metric (with 90% confidence intervals), which indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

So - quick check of your corruption perceptions. Which countries on the following list would you rank among 180 nations worldwide as being in the Top 5 Most Corrupt (indicated by a higher number ranking) and Top 5 Least Corrupt (indicated by a lower number ranking)?

• Singapore
• Myanmar
• United States
• Somalia
• Afghanistan
• New Zealand

According to the 2009 CPI, the countries perceived as least corrupt are:

• 1 - New Zealand
• 2 - Denmark
• 3 - Singapore
• 3 (tie)- Sweden
• 5 - Switzerland

According to the 2009 CPI, the countries perceived as most corrupt are:

• 176- Iraq
• 176 (tie) - Sudan
• 178 - Myanmar
• 179 – Afghanistan
• 180 – Somalia

The United States and the United Kingdom are definitely toward the "less corrupt" end of the continuum, but neither leads the way. Some other country rankings you may be wondering about:

• US - #17
• UK - #19
• Brazil - #75
• China - #79
• India - #84
• Russia - #146
• Venezuela - #162
• Iran - #168

The "New" Authoritarianism

Remember the old days of the iron-fisted dictator?

Using the blunt instruments of fear and force, they dominated all within their purview, but were largely marginalized by the rest of the civilized world.

Welcome to a new era of the globally-savvy despot.

Sure, the authoritarian rulers of today still use some of the old-school, tried-and-true tactics - they undermine the rule of law by rewarding loyalists and intimidating dissidents - but they apparently have also learned to strike smarter, not just harder.

They have realized the power of the Internet, the media, and the global marketplace. They do not just blackout information, they carefully manipulate it. And they use the pathways of globalization to exert market influence for economic and political gain, and to leverage international legitimacy and foreign aid. Even if the leaders' temperaments and styles of governance are unpopular or distasteful, it is difficult to deny their effects on foreign policy, global security and economy.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia - organizations that know quite a bit about public influence - convened a group of experts to analyze the ways in which five influential countries --China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Venezuela -- impede democratic development both within and beyond their borders. Their research resulted in the new report just released today, "Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians," which explores the common traits of these regimes and how they are largely responsible for the recent overall decline in political freedom throughout the world.

Here are some highlights and key findings from the report:

Capsule Summary: Pivotal authoritarian regimes have adapted and modernized their repressive methods and are undermining democracy in updated, sophisticated, and well funded ways. The result is a disruptive and serious new challenge to the emergence of an international system based on the rule of law, human rights, and open expression.

• Democracy Redefined: Leading authoritarian regimes are working to reshape the public understanding of democracy. A redefined and heavily distorted version of the concept is communicated to domestic audiences through state-dominated media.

• Internet Under Threat: The leading authoritarians—particularly in China, Iran, and Russia—are using advanced and well-funded techniques to subvert legitimate online discourse, often using loyal commentators and provocateurs.

• Authoritarian Foreign Aid: These regimes are using soft-power methods to advance their interests internationally, particularly through billions of dollars in no-strings attached development aid.

• Rules-Based Organizations Under Siege: At the regional and international level, these authoritarian regimes are undercutting or crippling the democracy-promotion and human rights efforts of rules-based organizations including the United Nations,

• Illiberal Education—Tainting the Next Generation: By either actively promoting or encouraging the presentation of history through a strongly nationalistic or extremist lens, authoritarian regimes are inculcating in the next generation attitudes of hostility toward democracy and suspicion of the outside world.

Common Traits:

While there are indisputably major differences among this group of countries, the analysis in Undermining Democracy reveals important common traits. Each of the fi ve is ruled by a relatively small in-group—usually with a limited degree of internal rivalry—that uses the power and wealth of the state primarily to serve its own interests, and secondarily to ensure either the explicit or passive support of the masses. In keeping with this oligarchic power structure, each is also promoting or enabling antidemocratic standards and values, both at home and abroad. An absence of institutional accountability leads to repressive and arbitrary governance, and to entrenched, rampant corruption. Finally, the lack of built-in corrective mechanisms like genuinely competitive elections, free media, independent civil society organizations, and the rule of law make these systems inherently unstable, as basic problems and irresponsible policies are allowed to fester and grow into major crises.

Conclusion:

During the height of the Cold War, there was little ambiguity about the nature and designs of the dominant authoritarian states. The current environment presents a murkier picture. Modern authoritarian governments are integrated into the global economy and participate in many of the world’s established fi nancial and political institutions. And while they tolerate little pluralism at home, they often call for a “multipolar” world in which their respective ideologies can coexist peacefully with others.

Human Trafficking Research

With funding support from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ GRANT-2007-VT-BX-K002) researchers Elzbieta Gozdiak and Micha Bump of the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University have complied a comprehensive bibliography of research related to Human Trafficking. Their report is called: Data and Research on Human Trafficking: Bibliography of Research-Based Literature.

Gozdiak and Bump begin by noting that " In the United States, human trafficking became a focus of activities in the late 1990s and culminated in the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) signed into law on October 16, 2000. With the enactment of the TVPA, the United States took a lead in combating human trafficking, prosecuting traffickers, and protecting victims."

The objective of their project was to compile a comprehensive bibliography of English language research-based literature on trafficking in persons, including trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation as well as trafficking to obtain human organs, and to create a taxonomy to categorize the results.

They identified 741 citations including reports, journal articles, and books.

• REPORTS: Reports accounted for more than half (58%) of all identified publications. Most (68%) of the 429 report were based on empirical research. There was a preponderance of qualitative methodologies, however 95 reports did rely on quantitative research. Most samples were convenience samples.

• JOURNAL ARTICLES: Two hundrend eighteen journal articles were identified, but only 39 were based on empirical research. All but one used qualitative methodologies, and the samples were generally quite small, and not randomly assigned. Most of the empirical research focuses on trafficking for sexual exploitation; only three out of the 39 journal articles deal with trafficking for labor exploitation and one focuses on domestic servitude. Thirty of the empirical research articles discuss trafficked women, seven discuss trafficked children, and two include discussion of trafficked men. The authors note that "very little is known about trafficking of men and boys, either for sexual exploitation or bonded labor. Only 14 journal articles include discussion of male victims of trafficking and one discusses the plight of male children."

• BOOKS: Ninety four (94) books were identified, the vast majority of which were based on non-empirical research.

Conclusions on the State of Research:

• "The analysis of the compiled bibliography on trafficking in persons suggests that the dominant anti-trafficking discourse is not evidence-based but grounded in the construction of particular mythology of trafficking (Sanghera 2005: 4). Despite the increased interest in human trafficking, relatively little systematic, empirically grounded, and based on solid theoretical underpinnings research has been done on this issue."

• Ideology and activism have seriously contaminated research on Human Trafficking.

• Research on human trafficking is largely disconnected from theory.

• "There is a need for both quantitative and qualitative research that would provide both macro-and micro-level understanding of the trafficking phenomenon. Rigorous ethnographic and sociological studies based on in-depth interviews with trafficking survivors would provide baseline data on trafficking victims and their characteristics."

• "Given the fact that services to trafficked persons are in their infancy, monitoring and evaluation studies should be an integral part of every assistance program, public and private. Well-designed monitoring and evaluation studies, particularly external evaluations, can identify effective policies and ‘best practice’ approaches as well as assess the success of different programs."

• "There is also a need for effective cooperation and coordination of research within and among different regions of the world. In addition, there is a need to establish a forum where research results can be exchanged between different scholars as well as shared with policy makers and service providers; such a forum can take a form of a specialized publication or an international task force."

In addition to the printed bibliography, all citations will be available in an EndNote database from NIJ.

Fact and Fiction About Child Soldiers

Scott Gates and Simon Reich, coeditors of the forthcoming book Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States, have become mythbusters in the study of child soldiers in armed conflict. In a web exclusive story on ForeignPolicy.com, they reveal “what human rights activists never tell you about young killers.” They address the following six points of conventional wisdom and offer their response to each.

1. "Child Soldiering Is a Human Rights Issue."

Gates and Reich do not deny that child soldiers are exploited casualties of conflict, but they also point out – even beyond the moral hazard – their proliferation poses geostrategic and development risks as well. Though children, they are also soldiers - often mobilized as cheap and expendable labor to commit atrocities and used for strategic advantage. The legacy of those who survive their childhood is a continuing risk for stability.

2. "There Are 300,000 Child Soldiers in the World."

Gates and Reich suggest the true global number is unknown and perhaps unknowable, but this often cited figure from the 1990s probably overestimates the scope today. They argue that – for strategy and development - it would be more useful to count by country, rather than globally. We could learn what proportion of a country’s child population was engaged in soldiering and what proportion of soldiers in a conflict were children. They say “child soldiers have constituted more than a quarter of all belligerents in many conflicts, including at least nine in Africa over the last two decades.”

3. "Most Child Soldiers Are African Boys."

“Not even close” Gates and Reich say. First, child soldiers have a variety of rols from support to armed fighting – so some prefer the term "children associated with fighting forces." Second, girls are a bigger part of the effort than you might think – they have fought in more than 40 conflicts over the past 20 years and comprise as much as 40% of some armed groups. Third, they point out “child soldiering is a global phenomenon, not simply an African one. More than 70 military organizations in 19 countries around the world recruited and used them in armed hostilities between 2004 and 2007.”

4. "Globalization Created Child Soldiering."

Gates and Reich say, bluntly, this is wrong; that child soldiering has existed for thousands of years. Ancient Spartans used boys as young as seven. They say the view of childhood (as a time for protection and nurture) and level of awareness have changed.

5. "Child Soldiers Are No Match for Western Militaries."

This is only true, the authors suggest, in “conventional combat” but most of the conflicts in which they are employed are irregular and asymmetric, where they have some advantage over convention military forces. Conventional soldiers often do not know how to respond to a child who is armed or suspected of being armed – perhaps even as a suicide bomber.

6. "Our Current Approach to Ending Child Soldiering Is Working."

Gates and Reich point out that current strategies focus on deterrence (prosecuting the adult recruiters) and demobilization (taking away the children's guns and sending them home), but neither approach goes far enough. Brokers of child soldiers are undeterred by sanctions because they believe (often correctly) they will not get caught or will ultimately be granted amnesty. The demobilization programs (like current “deradicalization” programs globally, I would note) are mixed. Often they exclude the eligibility important groups (like girls) or mis-train them for re-integration.

Weak states may be hazardous to your health (and your rights).

Human rights abuses are commonly associated with despotic, totalitarian regimes, not with weak and failing states. But Professor Neil Englehart’s recent study of 140 nations suggests that weak states may actually put personal security rights at the greatest risk.

Englehart defined state "capacity" as "the willingness and capability of the state apparatus to carry out government policy" not by a particular government’s stability, longevity, or popularity. He used three measures of capacity: (1) expert opinion on law and order (impartial legal system and general respect for the law); (2) expert opinion on state corruption; and (3) the state’s tax (which fund state services) as a proportion of gross domestic product.

Human right violations were measured by: (1) Political Terror Scale scores based on the US State Department annual human rights reports; (2) CIRI data on extrajudicial killing; and (3) CIRI data on political imprisonment. Each state’s degree of democratic vs authoritarian orientation (Polity IV) was also rated.

State capacity strongly predicted personal rights/security. The weaker the state’s capacity, the greater was the risk of human/personal security violations, except for political imprisonment. Weak state capacity did not predict that nearly as well. Instead, Democracy was the strongest predictor of protection from political imprisonment.

Because states are ultimately responsible to protect their citizens from human right abuses, it is common to blame them when these violations occur and to muster international support to shame the government into compliance. If a state genuinely lacks the capacity to protect its citizens, however, shaming is unlikely to be effective. Instead, this research suggests that bolstering capacity may yield more effective outcomes.

Englehart concludes: "There is an extensive literature suggesting the importance of state capacity for economic development. This suggests that state capacity will have a positive impact on both level of economic development and human rights conditions."

Englehart, N. (2009). State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights Journal of Peace Research, 46 (2), 163-180 DOI: 10.1177/0022343308100713