Mapping the Militant-Extremist Mindset

About a year ago, we reported here at SGSAC on a study attempting to identify key themes that might characterize a militant-extremist mindset. Gerard Saucier (University of Oregon) and his colleagues pored through numerous documents and extracted sixteen themes. Members of that same research team - this time led by Lazar Stankov (National Institute of Education in Singapore) - have continued this line of inquiry and spotted three central "psychological ingredients of the militant extremist mindset."

They started with a list of 56 statements they extracted from various materials produced by and about terrorists. The statements were presented to 2,424 college students (more than half of whom were female, average age of 21) from North America (USA), Eastern Europe (Serbia, Slovakia, Belarus), Latin America (Chile, Guatemala), and Asia (Malaysia, South Korea, China). They forthrightly note: "Needless to say, this sampling framework limits the generalization of the present findings beyond the student population." An important point, to be sure.

Students rated their agreement with each of the 56 militant-extremist statements on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from "strongly and completely disagree" to "strongly and completely agree." They also completed a measure of personality, a measure of social attitudes, and a measure of values.

Their first step was was to conduct an exploratory factor analysis of the items to see whether and how they might cluster together into themes. Thirty six of the statements seemed to fit within three general factors. The researcher examined the content of the items in each factor and removed twelve additional statements that seemed not to fit with the others in their cluster (factor). This left 24 items for further analysis - revealing the following three underlying factors:

• Proviolence: (statements indicating acceptance of, justification, and even advocacy of the use of violence in certain circumstances like revenge or to gain redemption)
• Vile World: (statements indicating there is something importantly wrong with the world in which we live)
• Divine Power: (statements referencing a divine power, heaven and God - role of martyrdom and rewards in the afterlife)

The three factors were fairly distinct and independent of each other. There was a modest correlation between VIle World and Divine Power.

They conclude "on the basis of our findings, we can say that an extremist militant mindset consists of three main ingredients:

"first there is a belief that violence is not only an option, but it may be a useful means to achieve one's personal and social goals."

"there needs to be an 'enemy' such as the West or a belief in a corrupt of Vile World that is perceived as the cause of suffering of the group to which the person belongs.

"violence needs to be sanctioned by someone, perhaps by a superior power (Divine Power/God).

Next, the items were composed as scales (Alpha coefficients .74-.80). While there was a broader range of views about (and item endorsement for) Vile World and Divine Power, only a small proportion (3.5% of the overall sample) scored "unusually high" on the Proviolence dimension.

The Divine Power dimension seemed to simply be a measure of tradition-oriented religious beliefs. It did not seem to contain anything unique - by itself - as a facet of a militant extremist mindset.

The Proviolence dimension was strongly related to social attitudes supporting unmitigated pursuit of self-interest, to personality disintegration, and power as a value. It was negatively related to positive personality traits and to values of benevolence, self-direction and universalism.

Demographic differences: There were few differences between men and women on Vile World or Divine Power beliefs, but men did tend to score significantly higher on Proviolence.

Between-Country differences: Respondent from the Asian countries tended to have somewhat higher Proviolence scores (though not indicating widespread endorsement of violence) than those in the other countries. Respondents from Serbia and Malysia tended to score higher than others on Vile World, while Chinese respondents had the lowest scores on this scale.

The authors are clear that the objective of their research is not to develop a measure to identify terrorists. That's an important point to make, I think. Also, to their credit, they readily acknowledge the limitations of using a college student sample.

While these three dimensions may not seem surprising, this is a line of research that has not been empirically investigated before - at least in this way. The multi-national sample also enhances the merit of its contribution - though we must continue to be cautious about not stereotyping people's beliefs just by their national citizenship (e.g., people from country X believe Y).

The study also raises a potentially interesting set of questions about how those factors might operate to facilitate or constrain violent extremist activity. About 50 years ago, Rokeach advanced the notion of "dogmatism," which he characterized as having a closed cognitive system, authoritarian bent (or absolute adherence to a source of authority), and intolerance. The interactions of those components can produce a different result than any one of them individually.

This might also turn out to be true for understanding the militant extremist mindset. The elements may not just be additive (more of them, resulting in greater militancy), but they may actually interact with or be conditioned on one another in ways that illuminate cognitive pathways or patterns (note the plural) toward ideologically or politically-motivated violence.

Stankov, L., Saucier, G., & Knežević, G. (2010). Militant extremist mind-set: Proviolence, Vile World, and Divine Power. Psychological Assessment, 22 (1), 70-86 DOI: 10.1037/a0016925

Understanding Support for Militancy in Pakistan

Stability in Pakistan is in the fundamental interest of (at least most of) the global security community. And militancy is widely regarded as the most serious and present threat to that stability. Pew regularly conducts and reports on surveys of Pakistani public opinion. Policymakers and analysts also have their own set of working assumptions. As with all policy decisions our understanding and assumptions about the problem will affect, if not drive, our strategy and intervention. A recent study by Jacob N. Shapiro, an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Codirector of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, and C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University casts doubt upon some of the most common assumptions about support for militancy in Pakistan. It is based on survey data from less than a thousand Pakstanis and carries its own set of limitations, but it nevertheless raises some very important questions.

METHOD:

The study is based on survey data from a representative sample of urban Pakistanis. Survey development was done jointly by United States Institute of Peace and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), and was conducted by A.C. Nielsen Pakistan.

Nine hundred seven (907) face-to-face interviews were conducted with urban Pakistanis in nineteen cities between September 12 to September 28, 2007. This was before President Pervez Musharraf declared a six-week state of emergency on November 2007 and three months before the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The sample was designed to be broadly representative of urban Pakistani adults aged eighteen and older. The overall response rate was 35 percent. (p.94)

How did they measure support for militancy?

Because Pakistanis are understandably reluctant to say they support groups such as al-Qaida when being questioned by someone noting their answers on a clipboard, we could not directly inquire about support for militant groups. Instead, we asked our respondents about the extent to which the activities of the following six groups posed a threat to “the vital interests of Pakistan in the next ten years”: Sindhi nationalists in Pakistan; Mohajir nationalists in Pakistan; Baluch nationalists in Pakistan; Islamist militants and local Taliban in the FATA and settled areas; al-Qaida; and askari tanzeems in Pakistan. (p. 96)

The study sought to examine empirically the notion that "support for militancy" is a dichotomous phenomenon among Pakistanis; that is that militancy is a "homogeneous phenomenon" and a tactical monolith; you're either for it or against it.

Analysts tend to describe militancy in Pakistan as a homogeneous phenomenon, or they tend to focus on a particular group presumed responsible for a particular attack. Popular accounts generally fail to note the differences across Pakistan’s militant groups, typically casting them all as al-Qaida affiliates. Because understanding the variation in support across militant groups requires at least understanding the potentially salient differences between them, this section describes key differences between the three groups of greatest concern to Western analysts: al-Qaida, the Taliban, and the diverse “askari tanzeems,” (militant groups), which claim to focus mostly on the Kashmir issue but are also involved in sectarian violence. (p. 85)

They then outlined four commonly held assumptions about militancy in Pakistan to be investigated empirically in the survey data.

Most discussions of the politics of militancy in Pakistan rest on a series of four widely accepted views about who supports militancy and why. The first is that poverty is a root cause of support for militancy, or at least that poorer and less educated individuals are more prone to militants’ appeals. This is a view that is held within and without Pakistan. The second is that personal religiosity and support for sharia law are strongly correlated with support for Islamist militancy. The third is that support for political goals espoused by legal Islamist parties predicts support for militant organizations. The fourth is that those who support democracy—either in terms of supporting democratic processes such as voting or in terms of valuing core democratic principles—oppose Islamism and militancy. (p.89)

Shapiro and Fair's results run counter to each of the popular assumptions. They found the following:

• Pakistanis are discriminating connoisseurs of militancy, and are selective in their support.

..support for militant organizations is not correlated across different types of militant groups. This finding suggests that Pakistanis distinguish among providers of political violence.

• Poverty and economic performance - at least at a national level - did not predict support for militancy.

...there is no clear connection between subjective or objective measures of economic strength and lower levels of support for the Taliban and al- Qaida. Contrary to common expectations, we found that respondents who come from economically successful areas or who believe Pakistan is doing well relative to India economically are more likely to support askari tanzeems. Thus, popular prescriptions that Pakistanis will support normalization of relations with India when they feel confident in their country’s economic and other measures of national power are not supported by these findings. (p. 115-116)

• Religious fervor itself did not appear to drive support for militancy.

.... religiosity is a poor predictor of support for militant organizations. A preference for more sharia law does not predict support for militant organizations. What does predict such support is a desire for change—positive or negative—in the perceived role of sharia in Pakistan. Similarly, identifying strongly as a Muslim does not predict support for Taliban militants fighting in Afghanistan or for al-Qaida. Although Islamic identity does predict support for askari tanzeems, the correlation disappears once we control for respondents’ support for other groups. Whatever the common factor driving support for all these militant organizations is, it is not religion per se. {italics added} Rather, underlying political considerations appear to be what is driving support.

• Faith in or support for democracy is not strongly related to Taliban support.

... we found no discernible relationship between respondents’ faith in democracy or support for core democratic rights and their disapproval of the Taliban or al-Qaida. These findings suggest that the much-heralded call for democratization as a palliative for militancy may be unfounded.(p. 116)

STUDY LIMITATIONS:

The study samples only urban Pakistanis (36% of the population). While urban areas may be the hub for militant recruiting, the results may not represent the views of rural Pakistanis.

The authors note that studying "support for militancy" addresses only the demand side of the problem, not the supply side. They also insightfully observe that no empirical data currently exist "that support the presumption—inherent in most surveys of Pakistanis’ views on these and related subjects—that decreases in the demand for support for militancy translates into a reduction of Islamist violence."

IMPLICATIONS:

• Support for militancy is Pakistan may be more nuanced and complex than many analysts so far have suggested.
• Further empirical research may support efforts to better understand and address the root causes of militant support.
• Further research and analysis should systematically study the outcome/effects/impacts of policies and actions on both the supply of and demand for violence. That research should include examinations of how reductions or changes in the demand for support for militancy affect actual rates of Islamist violence.

US efforts to counter militant support have so-far emphasized economic development, and democratization, in the context of religious fervor. The authors conclude with this somewhat provocative notion:

Taken together, these results suggest that commonly prescribed solutions to Islamist militancy—economic development, democratization, and the like—may be irrelevant at best and might even be counterproductive.

Shapiro, J., & Fair, C. (2010). Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan International Security, 34 (3), 79-118 DOI: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.79

SOCOM Commander Sees & Understands the Big Picture

I continue to be impressed by Adm. Eric Olson's deep and sophisticated understanding of contemporary armed conflict. When I have made this observation before, some have responded to me that his conclusions are actually rather obvious and so widely shared that they hardly merit recognition. What I find so encouraging, however, is that the leader of the world's most elite and lethal kinetic force understands that - in his words - "it’s the nonkinetic that will be decisive." In a large organization where those wielding hammers tend to see nothing but nails, Olson both understands and acts on the fact that a full array of tools are needed to get the job done. In my view, that is commendable and distinctive.

Yesterday (1/20/10), Olson testified before The House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism And Unconventional Threats where he highlighted some of the following points

• Regional AQ affiliate groups are a growing concern. The networking of affiliate groups has two pernicious effects: (1) it extends AQ’s global reach, posing an increasing threat to North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, India, Southeast Asia, and again in the United States; (2) it provides a more diversified infrastructure for recruitment and training.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a rising affiliate group that is benefiting from this process and whose leadership ranks are made up in part from Saudi and Yemeni extremists who have been released from detention or escaped from Yemeni jails.

• The network is still largely built on personal connections and relationships developed during the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s. Its growth and resilience are enabled by a convergence of instability, crime, corruption, and disruptive migration in the region.

The network sustains its operations mainly through individual relationships that are rooted in the 1980’s Afghanistan jihad against the former Soviet Union. The strength and tenacity of this network is due to the environment in which it functions. It is woven in the fabric of multi-ethnic communities, working with legitimate companies and charities while simultaneously exploiting the criminal networks to move people, money, and supplies around the world. Al-Qaida thrives on sources of friction created by a growing nexus between extremism, crime, and migration.

• AQ affiliate groups are increasingly stepping into ungoverned or under-governed spaces where they can more easily leverage a base of population support through aid or coercion.

The problems we must be prepared to address include the inability of nation states to deal with increasingly complex challenges and to meet the needs and expectations of their populations. These challenges are exacerbated by the growing number of non-state actors who have strategic effect in a networked and interconnected world. In the vacuum created by weak or failed governments, non-state actors have achieved greater influence over benign populations by addressing their basic needs and grievances, and by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing them into submission. When governments fail to address the needs of the population, they become irrelevant and the people will make choices that are shaped by their own immediate needs for survival.

Adm. Olson concludes with the following:

We believe that SOF must simultaneously focus on the environmental dynamics and root causes that create today’s and tomorrow’s threats and adversaries. This belief requires an approach that is integrated with our interagency partners to foster US credibility and influence among relevant populations. We clearly recognize that deterring, disrupting and defeating terrorist will require a whole-of-government and international approach.

You can read the testimony in its entirety HERE.

Transnational Threats Update

The latest update from CSIS' Transnational Threats Project is now available.




Transnational Threats Update November-December 2009
Vol. 7, No. 9

By Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas M. Sanderson
Jan 19, 2010

The Transnational Threats Update is produced by the Transnational Threats Project and provides monthly reports and analysis on terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and arms trafficking.

In this issue:

• Domestic Radicalization Gaining Ground?
• Russian Terrorism
• Saudi Arabia Brings the Heat to Yemen
• Lashkar-e-Taiba Goes Global
• Political Violence in the Philippines
• Thai Authorities Make Arms Trade Bust
• AQIM Runs Drugs to Europe
• Kingpin’s Death Leaves Wake of Violence
• Drone Disaster?
• Did Citibank Get Hacked by the Russian Mafia?

Lessons (or maybe just “Observations”) from the Cases of Abdulmutallab and Hasan

Lessons (or maybe just “Observations”) from the Cases of Abdulmutallab and Hasan

The expression: “Hindsight is 20/20,” captures the common wisdom of an empirical finding known as hindsight bias. The basic idea is that specific outcomes and consequences seem much more likely after – rather than before - they have occurred. Events seem to be more easily foreseeable after they have happened. A recent Washington Post article on the Hasan case says: “When viewed in retrospect, Hasan's life becomes an apparent trail of evidence that leads to an inevitable end.”

There are several factors that contribute to this common cognitive bias. One condition that fosters hindsight bias after catastrophic events is that after-the-fact most of the evidence is assembled together in one place, when previously the facts were scattered about. And, of course, all “warning signs” seem much more predictive and significant when we already know what eventually happens. Hindsight predictability is amplified further by the fact that the public rarely sees or hears about the cases in which the same “warning signs” were present but no bad outcome occurred.

This does not mean that we cannot or should not learn from past events, and use what we learn to do better. We can and we should. But our first priority should be to fix the cracks rather than to stand chest deep in rising water trying to figure out who knew what about the leaking cracks and when they knew it. Knowing that hindsight bias operates for nearly all of us humans, we might also consider being a bit more circumspect in estimating how predictable or foreseeable a particular horrific event may have been.

In that spirit, I’ll offer a few personal thoughts and observations about four possible “take away” insights from the Abdulmutallab and Hasan cases that might be used to help us think about what we might change or do differently to improve our ability to prevent future acts of terrorism.

1. Managing threats may be a greater challenge than identifying them.

After an attack, it seems there is often a reflexive outcry for “more training” to identify persons of concern. Ironically, there are also numerous people simultaneously coming forward to say that they had observed concerning behaviors or inappropriate communications on multiple occasions. Some did not know if their concern was “enough” to prompt an official report, while others will say that they did attempt to report their concerns to others. The after-the-fact collage of evidence begins to assemble.

It is not clear that either Abdulmutallab or Hasan came “from out of the blue” or flew completely under the radar. If that’s true, then the ever-present pursuit of a better “checklist” to identify the next bad guy may be neither necessary nor sufficient to improve prevention. Instead, systems might choose to focus on questions like:

• (1) When people saw or heard behaviors that concerned them, what influenced their decision about whether to report or share their concern with others?
• (2) When concerns were reported to others, how were those assessed and handled and what follow-up occurred?; and
• (3) What might have permitted the array of reported concerns from various sources to be aggregated and accessible to one (or more) authorities with prevention responsibilities?

2. Violent extremism is not always bred in an environment of poverty and deprivation.

Maybe the public has already moved past this assumption. There certainly have been numerous cases in the past 8 years to suggest that terrorism is not necessarily an affliction reserved for the poor and downtrodden. Abdulmutallab and Hasan were both persons of means; the former from a politically prominent and wealthy family and the latter, a trained physician and commissioned officer in the U.S. military. At a national and community-level, there are often good reasons to use economic development and assistance as part of a strategy to make areas less hospitable to extremists. At an individual level, however, poverty as an explanation for terrorism falls terribly short.

3. Social dimensions of violent extremism are absolutely critical.

Notwithstanding recently voiced concerns about a surge of “self-radicalization,” the process of adopting and acting upon a violent extremist ideology is nearly always marked by some degree of social influence. The nature of what is “social” has certainly changed over the past two decades, but interactions with others continue to be important markers on a pathway to terrorist violence.

It is common to think of the “charismatic leader” as the crux of the problem, but the real challenge is probably a bit more complex. A number of folks - Abdulmutallab and Hasan included – seem to have sought, not to have been sought by – the movement leaders with whom they had contact. Those who acted do not appear to have been entranced by charisma, but rather to have been seeking legitimacy, justification, and recognition from others as part of their path forward.

If that’s what you’re looking for, it’s not terribly hard to find; just go (virtually or in person) where there are likeminded others. The intellectual and emotional journey of many nascent militants is not so much driven by the well-informed pursuit of truth as it is by the need for certainty and consistency. This is what being connected to, and surrounded by, others (in a particular region, a training camp, a religious training school or a campus activist group) can provide – encouragement, belonging, and affirmation that they are on the right path.

4. Nothing succeeds like success.

Al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups have been rather successful in building the value of their “brand.” A large part of their post-9/11 success and the diffusion of their ideology comes from the prestige of that brand. AQ franchises have proliferated around the globe and individuals who want to be taken seriously, liberally use the Al-Qa’ida name even when their actual connections may be fairly tenuous. Media reports are sometimes equally loose in identifying Al-Qa’ida “members” and affiliates.

We cannot see inside the minds of Abdulmutallab and Hasan to discern their true motivations for violence. We do know that people are complicated and actions like this typically involve multiple motives operating simultaneously. Many reports also seem to suggest that each struggled at various times to fit in and to be accepted, whatever their financial means or professional accomplishments. If that’s the case, associating oneself with a powerful brand and a widely-feared movement might seem compellingly attractive.

Some researchers and analysts have observed that social movements generally – and militant jihadists specifically – seem to enjoy greater enlistment growth during periods of perceived prominence and operational success. The public and the security communities certainly need to take very seriously the threat posed by militant jihadist terrorists, but we might also be mindful not to inadvertently add equity to Al-Qa’ida’s brand or to create powerful, imposing icons of those claiming to act under its banner.

Radicalization is Not Just About Religion

Radicalization is a process not an event. Adopting a violent extremist ideology is rarely, if ever, “caused” by just one person, place or incident. It is often not even driven by purely religious motives. There are multiple paths that can lead one into terrorism. We need to accept the fact that there is some complexity here if we are going to make any substantial long-term progress in countering violent extremism. Major Nidal Hasan, the alleged Fort Hood shooter and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged Christmas or “Underwear” bomber are both recent reminders that we need to keep working at the problem.

Watch CBS News Videos Online

Quintan Wiktorowicz has done some of the most compelling empirical fieldwork in the study of Islamist radicalization based on dozens of interviews with affiliates of a militant group just outside London, England. He uses the lens of Social Movement Theory to understand the process. He finds that those who came to be radicalized first revealed an openness to new worldviews (cognitive opening), then came to view religion as a path to find meaning (religious seeking), eventually found the group’s narrative and ethos to “make sense” (frame alignment), and ultimately, through a process of socialization, became fully indoctrinated into the movement, and incorporated it as a central feature of their identities (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

Cognitive openness and a “seeker” mindset are very common in young people who are trying to figure out who they are, where they fit, and what ultimately will define them. In a sense, however, it is when they are most vulnerable to ideological influence. When you’re looking for answers, looking to belong, and looking for meaning – and someone comes along with clear-cut absolute answers, shows how you fit among a larger collective, and offers you truth and purpose – it becomes easy to bypass critical thinking.

Sometimes, people develop grievances on their own, then seek likeminded others for affiliation or affirmation. Other times, the political “grievances” of violent extremists are the consequence, rather than the cause of their militant alignment. People may experience personal crises or hardships on their own that increase their vulnerability, but recruiters, spotters, and other influencers need only smell a hint of openness, then they “explain” the individual’s problem as a mere symptom of a larger injustice – one for which violent action against wrongdoers is the “right” and necessary course of action.

In either case, we need to be clear that radicalization typically develops from an interaction between a (often motivated) seeker and inspirational figures within the radical movement. Those who “become radicalized” – in general - are not passive victims of brainwashing or aggressive outreach. The process evolves through social transaction – sometimes on the Internet, other times individually or in small groups – but each is providing something that the other wants.

As the investigations progress, it may turn out to be true that both Hasan and Abdulmutallab had some correspondence with or connection to Yemeni Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki (pictured at right) , but that does not mean that al-Awlaki is the sine qua non of these attacks. Preliminary reports seem to suggest that, if contact did occur, then it was the actors themselves – not al-Awlaki - who did the outreach.

In my next post, I will outline a few key “take-home” messages on understanding radicalization based on what we are learning from the Hasan and Abdulmutallab investigations.

-Randy Borum

Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, & Iran: The Importance of Connections

Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, & Iran: The Importance of Connections

Fighting continues in the Northwest between Yemeni government-backed forces (also supported by Saudi forces) and Yemeni Shi’a insurgents, led by the al-Houthi clan. The area around Sa'ada has been the major hot spot, and apparently allegiances in the local area are divided. Often these splits occur along tribal lines. The militants want to lay claim to an area – beyond the reach of the Yemeni government – where they can practice religion and promulgate official doctrine in a manner of their choosing.

This off-and-on struggle has endured for at least the past 5 years, but this is about as bad as it’s ever been. It has produced nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) so far. Some are fleeing Southward … where al-Qa’ida has recently renovated its terrorist-training franchise.

So - there are a number of inter-related problems here that reach far beyond Yemen itself. Here’s a quick glimpse:

If You Push Them, They Will Come… To Al-Qa’ida:

Violent extremists across the globe, particularly in the past decade, have increasingly deployed service-oriented diplomacy in their recruitment efforts. This approach has been wildly successful for Hizb’allah . They penetrate ungoverned spaces, set up social services (from medical clinics to core infrastructure) that local government lacks capacity or willingness to provide, and they build goodwill by taking on the role of “provider.” In some areas, they have so much control that they function like a proxy government, even collecting taxes from the citizens. When your young child is dying and your government shrugs its shoulders, and someone is there offering to help – that someone looks like a friend for life. That’s the plan. Now, hundreds of thousands of refugees are running away from their government in the Northwest and into Southern regions, which are heavily influenced by al-Qa’ida. If AQ becomes the port in the storm, we can plan to watch as the recruit tally steadily rises.

Yemen May Not Be a Gem, But It Might Be Kind of a Big Deal:

The neighborhood is a significant part of the challenge here. Not only are IDPs flocking to Southwest Yemen from the North, but they are coming just as steadily from across the pond in Somalia – a nation with its own set of governance and Islamist militancy troubles. A significant number of the recruits in AQ’s new South Yemen training campus are Somali. Southwest Yemen and Northeast Somalia lie directly across the Gulf of Aden from each other. That interstitial space – heavily plagued right now by Somali-based pirates – is a major shipping portal. One does not enter the Red Sea, except through that gateway. Nor can West-Coast Saudi Maritime traffic enter the Gulf of Aden except through that gateway. Piracy, pervasive but not yet highly organized off Somalia’s coast, has already cost millions of dollars. If an AQ/Shabaab coalition boosted the effort, it’s probably fair to say that would not help the World economy.

Saudi Arabia and Iran Both Have Dogs in the Fight:

Because the Houthi-affiliated militants several weeks ago stepped across the line into Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom launched a counteroffensive to push them back (and to support Yemen’s government-backed forces). Some in Yemen say this has added fuel to the insurgency, because even more are ready to fight against the Saudis than to fight for the Houthis. Saudi presence and activity lingers in NW Yemen, much to the dismay of Iran. Iran is still a bit miffed that 3-4 years ago the Saudi’s also stuck their nose in an international dispute when Israel launched a major offensive against Hizb’allah. Saudi supported Israel – and it’s probably no secret that there is some affinity between Hizb’allah and Iran. ‘Nuff said. Yemen, in fact, claims that Iran is now supporting the Houthi-affiliated insurgency, and that they (and also Hizb’allah) have been the main source for militant training. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center also thinks that Africa - East Africa in particular - is an important target for Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s ambitious foreign policy. Though most analysts see no major worry for a full-scale proxy war, having Saudi Arabia and Iran both join in the game - and on opposing sides - is -- let’s say “unlikely to facilitate regional peace.”

The concern here is clearly about more than two terribly impoverished, and under-governed countries. The current human rights challenges facing this area are certainly significant, but the economic and global security stakes may ultimately be even higher.

-Randy Borum

Afghanistan Options Made Simple (Though the Choice is Not)

Tomorrow night, in a televised address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Obama will reveal his long-awaited decision on the next steps in Afghanistan.

The U.S. currently has about 68,000 troops on the ground in Afghanistan. Every aspect of US operations there has been subject to intense debate. If there is any consensus to be had in understanding U.S. objectives there, the two stand-outs would probably be:

1. preventing Afghanistan from again being used as a home and safe haven for Al Qaeda; and
2. preventing the hazards of an ungoverned Afghanistan from destabilizing the region, especially Pakistan with its cache of nuclear weapon.

Joanna Gurney from The Truman National Security Project Educational Institute, has put together a presentation called “Afghanistan 101” for those who want a quick overview of the situation. It addresses our goal in Afghanistan; connections between al-Qaeda and the Taliban; US strategy -past and present; the role of Pakistan; and why the President is reconsidering US strategy there.

Here is a glance at the President's main menu of options (according to the NY Times):

Option #1: The Full Monty - 40,000 troops

This is almost as many as Gen. Stanley McChrystal requested. David Kilcullen, one of the chief architects of US COIN doctrine, believes at least 40,000 will be needed.

Under the big option, U.S. troop strength in Kandahar would more than triple. They would more than double in Helmland. And a new infusion would occupy East Afghanistan in the provinces of Paktika, Paktia and Khost (called "P2K"). About 10,000 of the new troops would be deployed primarily to help train and equip the indigenous Afghan Army for an eventual handoff.

Option #2 - The Middle Ground - 20,000 to 35,000 troops

This option is currently the odds-on favorite. This option has the support of heavyweight advisors such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen. Under this plan, there would be half as many military trainers, and much less emphasis on Helmland and P2K. For every 10,000 troops, you can count on a cost of about $10 billion per year.

Kilcullen thinks the middle ground is the worst possible option:

We can either put in enough troops to control the environment or we can credibly communicate our intention to leave. Either could work. Splitting the difference is not the way to go. It feels to me that all these options are dangerously close to the middle ground and we have to consider whether the middle ground is a good place to be. The middle ground is a good place on domestic issues, but not on strategy. You either commit to D-Day and invade the continent or you get Suez. Half-measures end up with Suez. Do it or not do it.

Option #3 - COIN Lite - 10,000 to 15,000 troops

This is Vice President Biden's preferred choice, but most other analysts are pretty skeptical and think the effects would be like putting a Band-Aid on an open chest wound. The rationale for the Lite plan is not to boost combat troop strength, but to focus on training indigenous forces and have more of the trigger-pulling and bad-guy-killing done by the locally unpopular Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones).

Remember the exciting new Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual? Well, if we were to follow the guidance of our own playbook - it would require a surge of more than a half million troops to fit the recommended troop:population ratio.

The Unconsidered Option - Calling it a Day

For a variety of reasons, I suppose, the idea of withdrawal didn't even have a "walk-on's" chance to make the cut. Those who think we should call it a draw and go home are a fairly diverse group, with different motivations.

Robert Jervis, for example, says: "Nothing looks good. ... I’m not convinced that withdrawal is as bad as the conventional wisdom has it. ..I’m really open to be convinced that the consequences are awful. And, of course, like all future, it’s unpredictable, but there are terrorist bases other than in Afghanistan, like in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. And I’m not convinced the Taliban, which of course is not united, would give Al Qaeda an opportunity to consolidate power the way it did in 2001. So unless the U.S. government can come up with a plan that looks to have some sensible prospect, I don’t see the point in sending more troops."

Matthew Hoh, a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and Senior Civilian representative for the US Government in Zabul Province (Afghanistan), in his September letter of resignation said: “To put simply: I fail to see the value or the worth in continued US casualties or expenditures of resources in support of the Afghan government in what is, truly, a 35-year-old civil war.”

Most of the drama surrounding the President's decision is already over before it is even announced. Now, we will have to see how it plays out. Lives and Nations are quite literally at stake.

From the Frying Pan Into the Fire: Somalis Flee to Yemen

You have to be pretty desperate to go to Yemen in search of a better life. Now - how about handing your life savings over to some shady character to transport you there ... that is, if you can survive the life-threatening journey? So far this year, more than 55,000 have done just that according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - all trying to make their way from the Horn of Africa, across the Gulf of Aden to their Yemeni utopia. More than 250 of them, for sure, this year have died trying to make that trip and another 150 are presumed to be dead. I'm guessing they don't get their money back either.

Why jump from the frying pan into the fire? In case you thought all this talk of "climate

change" and "global warming" was just just a concoction of some hand-wringing tree-huggers - in East Africa, the effects are as real as it gets. Half the population of Somalia is now in need of humanitarian assistance - that's more than three and a half million people. The droughts there are coming hard and fast, kicking the ass of whatever is left of Somali's agricultural industry. That means less available work and higher food prices. Much higher. It enough pressure to drive a man to ....well..Yemen.

Agencies like the UN's World Food Programme are trying to help, but in the past year four of them have been killed for their efforts. Islamist insurgents have also told citizens not to accept WFP aid or to cooperate with their assistance efforts. Plus, it's not as easy as you might think to get the food to the people who need it. Nearly all of Somalia's assistance arrives by sea. Anyone who's picked a news paper in the past couple of years knows that the waterways off the Somali coast are now every bit as dangerous as the streets of Mogadishu, where Sahaab militants have been stirring up some serious violence.

The Somali coast is plagued by piracy. The pirates and the Islamist militants are largely different groups of bad guys. The one thing that have most in common is that they both benefit from from a grossly ineffective government who is unable to provide even the most basic population security in the country outside of about 10 square city blocks. The world cannot easily afford further instability and lack of governance in such an important region, nor can we leave hotbeds of radicalization to fester unattended. The recent arrests of more than two dozen men in the "Little Mogadishu" area of Minnesota should be a sobering reminder that problems over there can have ramifications at home as well.

30 November 2009- ADDENDUM

Somali (Al Qaeda-linked insurgent) camps may pose threat to US
By Mohamed Olad Hassan /Associated Press /

MOGADISHU, Somalia - The recruits gather in scorching desert hideouts in Somalia, use portraits of President Obama for target practice, learn how to make and detonate bombs, and vow allegiance to Osama bin Laden.

Training camps in the lawless nation of Somalia are attracting hundreds of foreigners, including Americans, and Somalis recruited by a local insurgent group linked to Al Qaeda, according to local and US officials. American officials and private analysts say the camps pose a security threat far beyond the borders of Somalia, including to the US homeland.

Read the full story HERE.

If Al Qa’ida's in the Market for a New Place, Yemen Looks Like a Nice Neighborhood

Within the next ten years Yemen could either become a serious concern to the US or a success story in proactive intervention, according to CNAS (Center for a New American Security) analysts Andrew Exum and Richard Fontaine. Yemen is a relatively small, impoverished, and politically messy country lying along Saudi Arabia’s southern border and stretching along the Gulf of Aden, just across from the Horn of Africa.

It would be a very dangerous base for transnational terrorist groups and a hazardous spot for instability in an region of great geopolitical importance. The entire world has a stake in not seeing Yemen go to the bad guys.

Over the past year, concern about Yemen’s future has become increasingly widespread. On the human rights front, the UN and the Red Cross are worried that the flood of citizens running to get away from clashes between government forces and Shi'ite rebels (mostly in and around Sa'ada in the North) is drastically overcrowding the aid camps. Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world. There are already nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons from the conflict, and hundreds more are flooding in every day. One family tents are occupied by 3-4 families.

On the political front, the armed conflict is likely to get worse before it get any better. The Northern fighting has started spilling over into Saudi Arabia. That’s bad news for a bunch of reasons. The rebels say that Saudi Arabia has been enabling Yemeni troops, so they took control of a strip of Saudi border territory, leading the Saudi government to launch a counteroffensive. In the South, fighting is more sporadic, but support for secession is beginning to swell.

Al Qa’ida, as usual, is also stirring the pot. They are shouldering up alongside the Yemenis (and Saudis) to quash the Shi'ite rebel threat in the North, while attempting to build their own infrastructure in the South. U.S. military and intelligence officials have confirmed that AQ has recently opened a new training camp housing over 400 fighters in Yemen’s southern Abyan province. Most of the fighters are Yemeni, Saudi, or Somali.

Exum and Fontaine point to three emerging trends in Yemen that may also make for a more volatile climate. First, that Yemen who derives most of its national revenue from taxes on oil production, has been suffering marked declines in petroleum production. So much so that some analysts believe it may fall to zero in the next seven years. And they apparently have no economic back-up plan.

Second, Yemen’s population is expected to double in the next 25 years (but without concurrent economic growth to support it). The nation’s unemployment rate is 40%, and 46% of its 7.4 million primary school age children do not attend school. Many have to work to help support their families. The population is very young – nearly half are under the age of 15. The youth bulge has been a troubling demographic trend in areas of the world – like Yemen- already plagued by problems with violent extremism.

Third, Yemen is about to run out of ground water resources. A huge majority of their water is currently used in agriculture in ways that are highly, highly inefficient. The water crisis will have further detrimental effects on the economy, development, and human security.

Yemen appears to be poised to cultivate a new generation of young people, raised in poverty without job skills or education, knowing only war in their surroundings, to live in an abject economic climate without hope for future opportunity, where even basic life-sustaining resources such as water are scarce, but violent extremism is abundant. That can’t be good. Exum and Fontaine conclude:

This confluence of political, ideological, economic, and environmental forces will render Yemen a fertile ground for the training and recruitment of Islamist militant groups for the foreseeable future.

They believe that the:

United States should implement a comprehensive strategy that marries counterterrorism support, development assistance, diplomatic pressure, and efforts at political reconciliation.

They discuss their strategy in a bit more depth in the full Policy Brief, On the Knife’s Edge: Yemen’s Instability and the Threat to American Interests By Andrew M. Exum and Richard Fontaine.

30 November 2009 - ADDENDUM:

Christian Science Monitor
Ben Hancock

Saudi Arabia said Saturday it has cleared a mountain foothold used by Yemeni rebels along the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, in what appeared to be part of a larger battle against Al Qaeda's expansion.

The rebels, called Houthis, are followers of the Zaidi sect of Shiite Islam, and the Saudis believe both that they have ties to Shiite-dominated Iran and have Al Qaeda members within their ranks. Saudi Arabia fears they may destabilize Yemen, posing a major security threat to the world's largest oil exporter, reports Reuters.

Read the full article HERE.

Are Muslims More Likely than Others in the General Public to Justify Violence for a Noble Cause?

Over the years, some global opinion surveys and analysts have estimated that as many as 10% of Muslims worldwide hold violent extremist religious views. A recent polling study by the Gallup organization suggests a somewhat different view, and presents data comparing the views of Muslims with those of the general public in their respective countries.

Gallup- the well-known worldwide polling organization – teamed up with The Coexist Foundation to study how people of different faiths around the world view each other, and to examine with greater depth some specific attitudes and beliefs among persons of the Muslim faith in Germany, France and the UK - comparing these to the general public in those countries. The product of this effort is the recently released report: The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations With an in-depth analysis of Muslim integration in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. I will briefly review here the results of interfaith integration (for context) and the results of attitudes toward the justifiability of using violence toward civilians and using violence for a noble cause.

Religious Integration:

The first part involved a 27-country survey, spanning four continents examining the extent of isolation or integration among religious groups. Researchers created The Gallup Coexist Index as a metric, based on respondents’ attitudes toward, and interactions with, people of other religions. Index scores were used to classify people into one of three categories, defined as follows:

• Isolated: Isolated individuals tend not to be members of any particular faith group, but if they are, they tend to believe in the truth of their perspective above all others. They do not want to know about other religions. They also neither respect nor feel respected by those of other faiths.

• Tolerant: Tolerant individuals have a “live-and-let-live” attitude toward people of other faiths, and they generally feel that they treat others of different faiths with respect. However, they are not likely to learn from or about other religions.

• Integrated: Integrated individuals go beyond a “live-and-let-live” attitude and actively seek to know more about and learn from others of different religious traditions. They believe that most faiths make a positive contribution to society. Furthermore, integrated people not only feel they respect people from other faith traditions, but they also feel respected by them.

A greater proportion of the general public is “integrated” in the United States and Canada than in the European countries. Only 15% of Americans and 20% of Canadians, were classified as isolated, while this was true for 35% of Britons and 38% of Germans.

Religion and Views on Violence:

The second part of the study focused on the various views and values of Muslims in Germany, France and the UK. I will focus here just on questions concerning violence; specifically (1) the justifiability of attacks targeting civilians and (2) use of violence for a noble cause.

Muslims Compared to the General Public

The majority of European Muslims surveyed reject violence and the degree of religiosity (defined as religion being an important part of daily life) was not a reliable indicator of radicalism or the extent to which they believed that attacks on civilians were morally justified.

A substantial majority of Muslims (at least 82%) in each of the three countries said that attacks targeting civilians could not be morally justified at all. Small or very small proportions of Muslims and of the general public in each country say such attacks are completely justifiable.

- Four percent of French Muslims and 2% of the French public overall said that violence targeting civilians could be morally justified.

- Less than one half of 1% of German Muslims – and 1% of the German public overall- said that violence targeting civilians could be morally justified.

- Less than one half of 1% of British Muslims – and 3% of the British public overall- said that violence targeting civilians could be morally justified.

Regarding the use of violence for a noble cause, there was more variability between countries, but Muslims in each capital city were at least as likely as their country’s general public to reject the justifiability of violence for a noble cause.

- 80% of German Muslims (and 94% of Berlin Muslims) said that use of violence for a noble cause could not be justified at all, with 2% saying it is completely justifiable. 2% of Berlin Muslims and 10% of the German public thought such attacks were justifiable.

- 75% of French Muslims said that use of violence for a noble cause could not be justified at all, with 5% saying it is completely justifiable. 8% of Paris Muslims and 7% of the French public thought such attacks were justifiable.

- 48% of British Muslims said that use of violence for a noble cause could not be justified at all, with 6% saying it is completely justifiable. 8% of London Muslims and 10% of the British public thought such attacks were justifiable.

Comparing Those Who Think Religion is Important to Those Who Do Not

Across all three nations, the Gallup researcher found that those who said religion is an important of their lives were at least as likely as those saying religion is not important to believe the use of violence for a noble cause cannot be morally justified at all.

For context, a 2007 Gallup poll of the general European public found roughly equal percentages of respondents for whom religion is an important part of their daily lives and those for whom religion is not important to say that violence for a noble cause cannot be morally justified. Similarly, in this poll there was no statistically significant difference between religious and nonreligious respondents with regard to whether they thought attacks targeting civilians were morally justifiable.