SOCOM Commander Sees & Understands the Big Picture

I continue to be impressed by Adm. Eric Olson's deep and sophisticated understanding of contemporary armed conflict. When I have made this observation before, some have responded to me that his conclusions are actually rather obvious and so widely shared that they hardly merit recognition. What I find so encouraging, however, is that the leader of the world's most elite and lethal kinetic force understands that - in his words - "it’s the nonkinetic that will be decisive." In a large organization where those wielding hammers tend to see nothing but nails, Olson both understands and acts on the fact that a full array of tools are needed to get the job done. In my view, that is commendable and distinctive.

Yesterday (1/20/10), Olson testified before The House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism And Unconventional Threats where he highlighted some of the following points

• Regional AQ affiliate groups are a growing concern. The networking of affiliate groups has two pernicious effects: (1) it extends AQ’s global reach, posing an increasing threat to North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, India, Southeast Asia, and again in the United States; (2) it provides a more diversified infrastructure for recruitment and training.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a rising affiliate group that is benefiting from this process and whose leadership ranks are made up in part from Saudi and Yemeni extremists who have been released from detention or escaped from Yemeni jails.

• The network is still largely built on personal connections and relationships developed during the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s. Its growth and resilience are enabled by a convergence of instability, crime, corruption, and disruptive migration in the region.

The network sustains its operations mainly through individual relationships that are rooted in the 1980’s Afghanistan jihad against the former Soviet Union. The strength and tenacity of this network is due to the environment in which it functions. It is woven in the fabric of multi-ethnic communities, working with legitimate companies and charities while simultaneously exploiting the criminal networks to move people, money, and supplies around the world. Al-Qaida thrives on sources of friction created by a growing nexus between extremism, crime, and migration.

• AQ affiliate groups are increasingly stepping into ungoverned or under-governed spaces where they can more easily leverage a base of population support through aid or coercion.

The problems we must be prepared to address include the inability of nation states to deal with increasingly complex challenges and to meet the needs and expectations of their populations. These challenges are exacerbated by the growing number of non-state actors who have strategic effect in a networked and interconnected world. In the vacuum created by weak or failed governments, non-state actors have achieved greater influence over benign populations by addressing their basic needs and grievances, and by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing them into submission. When governments fail to address the needs of the population, they become irrelevant and the people will make choices that are shaped by their own immediate needs for survival.

Adm. Olson concludes with the following:

We believe that SOF must simultaneously focus on the environmental dynamics and root causes that create today’s and tomorrow’s threats and adversaries. This belief requires an approach that is integrated with our interagency partners to foster US credibility and influence among relevant populations. We clearly recognize that deterring, disrupting and defeating terrorist will require a whole-of-government and international approach.

You can read the testimony in its entirety HERE.

Transnational Threats Update

The latest update from CSIS' Transnational Threats Project is now available.




Transnational Threats Update November-December 2009
Vol. 7, No. 9

By Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas M. Sanderson
Jan 19, 2010

The Transnational Threats Update is produced by the Transnational Threats Project and provides monthly reports and analysis on terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and arms trafficking.

In this issue:

• Domestic Radicalization Gaining Ground?
• Russian Terrorism
• Saudi Arabia Brings the Heat to Yemen
• Lashkar-e-Taiba Goes Global
• Political Violence in the Philippines
• Thai Authorities Make Arms Trade Bust
• AQIM Runs Drugs to Europe
• Kingpin’s Death Leaves Wake of Violence
• Drone Disaster?
• Did Citibank Get Hacked by the Russian Mafia?

Corruption, Inc - Worldwide Rankings

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, according to Transparency International (TI), a non-partisan, global civil society organization founded in 1993 that opposes corruption, and works to facilitate a peaceful worldwide coalition aimed at ending corruption’s devastating effects around the world.

TI believes that corruption has dire global consequences, trapping millions in poverty and misery and breeding social, economic and political unrest by undermining democracy and the rule of law; distorting national and international trade; and threatening the security and sustainability of natural resources.

TI has a useful array of policy products and publications available, two of which I will mention specifically here:

Global Corruption Barometer 2009 (published in English, French, Spanish) presents the main findings of a public opinion survey exploring the general public’s views of corruption, as well as experiences of bribery around the world. It assesses the extent to which key institutions and public services are perceived to be corrupt, measures citizens’ views on government efforts to fight corruption, and this year, for the first time, includes questions about the level of state capture and people’s willingness to pay a premium for clean corporate behavior.

The 2009 Global Corruption Barometer survey interviewed 73,132 people in 69 countries and territories between October 2008 and February 2009. The main findings were:

• Corruption in and by the private sector is of growing concern to the general public
• Political parties and the civil service are perceived on average to be the most corrupt sectors around the world
• Experience of petty bribery is reported to be growing in some parts of the world – with the police the most likely recipients of bribes
• Ordinary people do not feel empowered to speak out about corruption
• Governments are considered to be ineffective in the fight against corruption – a view that has remained worryingly consistent in most countries over time

The Global Corruption Barometer is designed to complement the expert opinions on public sector corruption provided by the second of TI’s flagship publications, the Corruption Perceptions Index.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. The CPI is a "survey of surveys", based on 13 different expert and business surveys. It ranks the countries on a common metric (with 90% confidence intervals), which indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

So - quick check of your corruption perceptions. Which countries on the following list would you rank among 180 nations worldwide as being in the Top 5 Most Corrupt (indicated by a higher number ranking) and Top 5 Least Corrupt (indicated by a lower number ranking)?

• Singapore
• Myanmar
• United States
• Somalia
• Afghanistan
• New Zealand

According to the 2009 CPI, the countries perceived as least corrupt are:

• 1 - New Zealand
• 2 - Denmark
• 3 - Singapore
• 3 (tie)- Sweden
• 5 - Switzerland

According to the 2009 CPI, the countries perceived as most corrupt are:

• 176- Iraq
• 176 (tie) - Sudan
• 178 - Myanmar
• 179 – Afghanistan
• 180 – Somalia

The United States and the United Kingdom are definitely toward the "less corrupt" end of the continuum, but neither leads the way. Some other country rankings you may be wondering about:

• US - #17
• UK - #19
• Brazil - #75
• China - #79
• India - #84
• Russia - #146
• Venezuela - #162
• Iran - #168

Putting Together the Pieces of Complexity & the Return of Shining Path

How does all this global security & armed conflict stuff fit together?

Let me take a moment to integrate a couple of related snippets previously reported here ("Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict" ) and give a new example of the connections between them.

Just as a quick refresher, we have addressed the following characteristics of the complex terrain that is now our shared global space:

• Criminal gangs are increasingly linking to armed insurgent movements.

• Criminal organizations are increasingly connected to terrorist organizations.

• Terrorist organizations and armed groups are both increasingly engaged in and connected to criminal activity - not just to support political goals.

• Corrupt and totalitarian governments weaken or disregard the rule of law and create environments that make it easy for criminal and subversive activity to flourish and for gross human rights violations to go unchecked.

• Authoritarian state leaders have started to control their populations in increasingly sophisticated ways - not just through violence and intimidation, but also by using technology to manipulate the information space - their own version of a "hearts and minds" campaign.

• Finally, we have seen that drugs generally continue to be the top selling commodity in transnational criminal enterprises. If one is interested in being a major player in the drug trade in a corrupt or lawless region, it helps to have a guy with a gun - or a group of guys with guns - who "got your back." It makes it easier to get the land and facilities you need; to protect those assets from competitors and poachers; to facilitate the trade and safe transport of your product; and to establish your dominance in an environment where everyone is looking for a piece of the action.

Keeping these trends in mind, consider the new Heritage Foundation report: Narco-Terrorism in Peru: The Return of Shining Path by James M. Roberts and Edwar Enrique Escalante. They report that the Shining Path, the Peruvian Maoist/Marxist/Leninist guerrilla group born in the 1960s has made a comeback..with a vengeance. Recent credits include kidnapping, assassination and murder of young Peruvian soldiers.

Surely, you might think, such a group would be feared and despised among its populace. But opting for honey over vinegar, Shining Path has opted to provide some supportive services for "the people" including food, dental care, and even barber services.

Where does a group like Shining Path find the money to support such activities? Right. Cocaine trade and trafficking. They have inserted themselves aggressively into the Capitalist market - albeit an illicit market - that they originally formed to fight against.

And because in a globalized world, borders can be a benefit, rather than an impediment, Shining Path has found tactical allies and kindred spirits among their guerrilla comrades in Columbia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC). Roberts and Escalante also report that the leader of Peru's nationalist party has pushed to get the Peruvian military out of the cocaine-heavy areas of the country. That political leader, by the way, is also wink/nudge pal of Venezuelan neighbor, Hugo Chávez.

So - recalling the global security trends we have outlined over the past couple of weeks - we see where this is going, right? Maybe there is time to salvage the relative stability of the Peruvian democracy before it becomes the region's next narco-state.

The "New" Authoritarianism

Remember the old days of the iron-fisted dictator?

Using the blunt instruments of fear and force, they dominated all within their purview, but were largely marginalized by the rest of the civilized world.

Welcome to a new era of the globally-savvy despot.

Sure, the authoritarian rulers of today still use some of the old-school, tried-and-true tactics - they undermine the rule of law by rewarding loyalists and intimidating dissidents - but they apparently have also learned to strike smarter, not just harder.

They have realized the power of the Internet, the media, and the global marketplace. They do not just blackout information, they carefully manipulate it. And they use the pathways of globalization to exert market influence for economic and political gain, and to leverage international legitimacy and foreign aid. Even if the leaders' temperaments and styles of governance are unpopular or distasteful, it is difficult to deny their effects on foreign policy, global security and economy.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia - organizations that know quite a bit about public influence - convened a group of experts to analyze the ways in which five influential countries --China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Venezuela -- impede democratic development both within and beyond their borders. Their research resulted in the new report just released today, "Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians," which explores the common traits of these regimes and how they are largely responsible for the recent overall decline in political freedom throughout the world.

Here are some highlights and key findings from the report:

Capsule Summary: Pivotal authoritarian regimes have adapted and modernized their repressive methods and are undermining democracy in updated, sophisticated, and well funded ways. The result is a disruptive and serious new challenge to the emergence of an international system based on the rule of law, human rights, and open expression.

• Democracy Redefined: Leading authoritarian regimes are working to reshape the public understanding of democracy. A redefined and heavily distorted version of the concept is communicated to domestic audiences through state-dominated media.

• Internet Under Threat: The leading authoritarians—particularly in China, Iran, and Russia—are using advanced and well-funded techniques to subvert legitimate online discourse, often using loyal commentators and provocateurs.

• Authoritarian Foreign Aid: These regimes are using soft-power methods to advance their interests internationally, particularly through billions of dollars in no-strings attached development aid.

• Rules-Based Organizations Under Siege: At the regional and international level, these authoritarian regimes are undercutting or crippling the democracy-promotion and human rights efforts of rules-based organizations including the United Nations,

• Illiberal Education—Tainting the Next Generation: By either actively promoting or encouraging the presentation of history through a strongly nationalistic or extremist lens, authoritarian regimes are inculcating in the next generation attitudes of hostility toward democracy and suspicion of the outside world.

Common Traits:

While there are indisputably major differences among this group of countries, the analysis in Undermining Democracy reveals important common traits. Each of the fi ve is ruled by a relatively small in-group—usually with a limited degree of internal rivalry—that uses the power and wealth of the state primarily to serve its own interests, and secondarily to ensure either the explicit or passive support of the masses. In keeping with this oligarchic power structure, each is also promoting or enabling antidemocratic standards and values, both at home and abroad. An absence of institutional accountability leads to repressive and arbitrary governance, and to entrenched, rampant corruption. Finally, the lack of built-in corrective mechanisms like genuinely competitive elections, free media, independent civil society organizations, and the rule of law make these systems inherently unstable, as basic problems and irresponsible policies are allowed to fester and grow into major crises.

Conclusion:

During the height of the Cold War, there was little ambiguity about the nature and designs of the dominant authoritarian states. The current environment presents a murkier picture. Modern authoritarian governments are integrated into the global economy and participate in many of the world’s established fi nancial and political institutions. And while they tolerate little pluralism at home, they often call for a “multipolar” world in which their respective ideologies can coexist peacefully with others.

Gangs & Insurgencies

John P. Sullivan from the LA Sheriff’s Office and the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST) has an interesting analysis this week, published in Small Wars Journal, on the connections between gangs, crime and war. This article summarizes and builds upon some of his work on the topic over the past decade. He proposes a “framework for understanding ‘criminal insurgencies’ where acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.” Sullivan’s work represents an excellent opportunity to apply criminological research to global security issues. It also causes me to reflect on how the analysis of transnational gangs might also benefit from research and analysis on “armed groups,” including the thoughtful work of folks like Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew. The following are excerpts from Sullivan’s article - RB:

John P. Sullivan. Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence. Small Wars Journal 5/31/09.

Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war, particularly in ‘criminal enclaves’ or ’lawless zones’ where civil governance, traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded.

Criminal gangs come in many forms. Some advanced gangs—known as ‘third generation gangs’ and/or maras—are waging ‘wars” and changing the dynamics of crime. In some extreme cases they are waging a de facto criminal insurgency. They are transnational in scope and impact and have the potential to change the nature of war and politics.

Samuel D. Porteous, in “The Threat from Transnational Crime: An Intelligence Perspective,” explains that transnational crime:

• undermines civil society, political systems and state sovereignty by normalizing violence and legitimizing corruption
  
• erodes society by distorting market mechanisms through the disruption of equitable commercial transactions
  
• degrades the environment by sidelining environmental regulation and safeguards.

Examining Cartel Evolution

1st Phase Cartel (Aggressive Competitor) : The first phase cartel form originated in Colombia during the 1980s and arose as an outcome of increasing US cocaine demand. This type of cartel, characterized by the Medellín model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970s. This early cartel was an aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity for extreme violence and willingness to directly challenge the authority of the state.

2nd Phase Cartel (Subtle Co-Opter): The second phase cartel form also originally developed in Colombia, but in this instance, is centered in the city of Cali. Unlike their Medellín counterparts, the Cali cartel was shadowy organization devoid of an actual kingpin. Its organization is more distributed and network-like, rather than hierarchical. Many of its characteristics and activities were stealth-masked and dispersed, which yielded many operational capabilities not possessed by the first phase cartel form. Specifically, it possessed leadership clusters that are more difficult to identify and target with a decapitation attack.

3rd Phase Cartel (Criminal State Successor) : Third Phase Cartels, if and when they emerge, have the potential to pose a significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its institutions. A Third Phase Cartel is a consequence of unremitting corruption and co-option of state institutions. While this "criminal state successor" has yet to emerge, warning signs of its eventual arrival are present in many states worldwide. Of current importance in the United States are the conditions favoring narco- or criminal-state evolution in Mexico. Essentially, third phase cartels rule criminal enclaves, acting much like warlords.

Transnational gangs are another state challenger. Transnational maras have evolved into a transnational security concern throughout North and Central America. Transnational gangs can be defined as having one or more of the following characteristics:

• criminally active and operational in more than one country;


• criminal operations committed by gangsters in one country are planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country;


• they are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations; and

• their activities are sophisticated and transcend borders.

Gangs have evolved as they have been influenced over time by : politicization, internationalization, and sophistication. The three generations of gangs can be described as follows:

Turf: First Generation Gangs are traditional street gangs with a turf orientation. Operating at the lower end of extreme societal violence, they have loose leadership and focus their attention on turf protection and gang loyalty within their immediate environs (often a few blocks or a neighborhood). When they engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely opportunistic and local in scope. These turf gangs are limited in political scope and sophistication.

Market: Second Generation Gangs are engaged in business. They are entrepreneurial and drug-centered. They protect their markets and use violence to control their competition. They have a broader, market-focused, sometimes overtly political agenda and operate in a broader spatial or geographic area. Their operations sometimes involve multi-state and even international areas. Their tendency for centralized leadership and sophisticated operations for market protection places them in the center of the range of politicization, internationalization and sophistication.

Mercenary/Political: Third Generation Gangs have evolved political aims. They operate—or seek to operate—at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to garner power, aid financial acquisition and engage in mercenary-type activities. To date, most third generation (3 GEN) gangs have been primarily mercenary in orientation; yet, in some cases they have sought to further their own political and social objectives.

Bruneau, paraphrased below, describes five (multi) national security threats or challenges associated with transnational maras:

• They strain government capacity by overwhelming police and legal systems
  through sheer audacity, violence, and numbers.


• They challenge the legitimacy of the state, particularly in regions where the culture of democracy is challenged by corruption and reinforced by the inability of political systems to function well enough to provide public goods and services.


• They act as surrogate or alternate governments. For example in some regions (i.e., El Salvador and Guatemala) the “governments have all but given up in some areas of
  the capitals, and the maras extract taxes on individuals and businesses.”


• They dominate the informal economic sector, establishing small
  businesses and using violence and coercion to unfairly compete with legitimate
  businesses while avoiding taxes and co-opting government regulators.


• They infiltrate police and non-governmental organizations to further
  their goals and in doing so demonstrate latent political aims.

Sullivan’s Conclusion: "Intelligence and operational art need to be closely integrated. A high degree of co-ordination and co-operation among government agencies and community groups at all levels of governance is needed. This requires both police forces and intelligence services need to co-operate across borders to gain understanding and achieve the ‘co-production” of intelligence necessary to counter transnational criminal threats."

Conflict Horizon - Issue #1

Here are a few resources, pointers and backgrounders to stay apprised on what's happening in conflict hot spots around the globe:

ICG-CrisisWatch N°70, 1 June 2009
International Crisis Group

International Crisis Group regularly monitors and reports on global conflicts. They have now published their update for June, 2009.

Nine actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated and none improved in May 2009, according to CrisisWatch. Somalia was rocked by intense fighting as an alliance of anti-government Islamist factions launched a large-scale offensive in and around Mogadishu, and Crisis Group identifies a Conflict Risk Alert for June. In Pakistan the army’s heavy offensive against the Taliban continued, leading to a massive humanitarian crisis with more than 2.4 million displaced. Tensions between Chad and Sudan escalated following an assault by Chadian rebels from bases across the border in Darfur, prompting retaliatory air strikes by Chadian forces on Sudanese soil. Read the full report HERE

Jihadists attack Somalia: Al-Qaeda on the march
Economist.com

Barely supported by the West, Somalia's new government may buckle under the latest wave of jihadist assaults. Only a few months after Somalia’s latest “transitional” government was set up amid a rare burst of albeit cautious optimism, Somali radicals linked to Al-Qaeda are gaining strength, while moderate Islamists are losing ground. A fresh flow of foreign fighters is also said to be heading for Mogadishu as suicide bombings have increased. When Ethiopia invaded Somalia with American encouragement in 2006, the aim was to fend off any kind of Islamist threat to Ethiopia and to catch the handful of Al-Qaeda people sheltering in the country. The invasion and the ensuing air raids destroyed the first incarnation of Somalia’s jihadists but the second seems to be proving stronger and fiercer. Read the full report HERE

Caucasus jihad: Terror tactics back on the horizon?
The Long War Journal

Recent attacks in the Caucasus and statements by the leader of the Caucasus Emirate indicate the jihadist movement is reverting back to the use of terror tactics that plagued the second war of Chechnya. This potential return to terror tactics may be an attempt to implicate the governing elites as illegitimate and incapable of effective rule or security over the region, in response to Moscow's claims that the insurgency is officially defeated. Read the full report HERE

The Strategic Debate Over Afghanistan
Stratfor

After U.S. airstrikes killed scores of civilians in western Afghanistan this past week, White House National Security Adviser Gen. James L. Jones said the United States would continue with the airstrikes and would not tie the hands of U.S. generals fighting in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus has cautioned against using tactics that undermine strategic U.S. goals in Afghanistan — raising the question of what exactly are the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. A debate inside the U.S. camp has emerged over this very question, the outcome of which is likely to determine the future of the region. Read the full report HERE

Security in Mexico. Implications for U.S. Policy Options
RAND

Violence in Mexico has spiked over the past four years and is increasingly affecting the United States. In response, both the Mexican government and the U.S. government are searching for ways to improve security in Mexico. This monograph examines the security situation in Mexico and assesses its impact on the United States. In addition, it outlines a number of policy options that the United States can consider in its efforts to assist the Mexican government in improving internal security in Mexico. Read the full report HERE

Murder Capital of the World??

Which of the following Latin American countries has the highest murder rate?

a. Nicaragua
b. Mexico
c. Venezuela
d. Jamaica

If you answered "Mexico", you made a very reasonable choice. In the past year, violence has been so rampant there that murder numbers have often exceeded 100 per week. But Mexico does not have the worst problem in the region - that distinction goes to .... Venezuela. Venezuela's rate of 48 violent deaths per 100,000 people is double that of Mexico.

Now, if asked instead to name the top-spot for homicide in all South America, surely drug-crime-ravaged Columbia would come readily to mind. But Venezuela's murder stats soar above Columbia's as well.

Shannon O'Neil - a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations - provides some details on the plight of this troubled nation - that sits in a troubled region where murder rates are triple the global average.

According to O'Neil:

• These murders occur mostly at night and spike every two weeks around payday.

• Young people are increasingly the victims, three times more likely to be killed today than 10 years ago.

• Not surprisingly, Venezuelans see crime and public safety as the No. 1 challenge for their country.

Why Venezuela?

O'Neil points out there that there is no single cause, but a convergence of problems that have taken their toll, particularly during Hugo Chávez's tenure over the past decade. Some of it seems related to Chávez's own brand of leadership - openly accusing public figures of criminal activity and condoning violence against anti-government protesters. Loyalty to Chávez trumps the law. Trust in the legitimacy of major state institutions is virtually nonexistent. Other causes include the following:

• Venezuela has become the new "Grand Central" of Andean cocaine traffic, and perhaps even the prime transit point for European shipment.

• Though Chávez replaced local police with a National force, law enforcement still lacks capacity - in skill, personnel or equipment - and often motivation to properly investigate the serious crimes they now face. Officers have no confidence that justice will prevail in the system, and they not uncommonly treat offenders with brutality.

• Policing has also become politicized, with pressure not to lean too heavily on the poor working-class communities. But this creates pervasive disorder.

• The justice system is weak and dysfunctional, undermining the rule of law. Most Venezuelans believe that the police are involved in a lot of the crimes. So - no surprise - crime doesn't even get reported. Courts are perceived as unjust - sentencing only 3 of every hundred murderers.

Human Trafficking Research

With funding support from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ GRANT-2007-VT-BX-K002) researchers Elzbieta Gozdiak and Micha Bump of the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University have complied a comprehensive bibliography of research related to Human Trafficking. Their report is called: Data and Research on Human Trafficking: Bibliography of Research-Based Literature.

Gozdiak and Bump begin by noting that " In the United States, human trafficking became a focus of activities in the late 1990s and culminated in the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) signed into law on October 16, 2000. With the enactment of the TVPA, the United States took a lead in combating human trafficking, prosecuting traffickers, and protecting victims."

The objective of their project was to compile a comprehensive bibliography of English language research-based literature on trafficking in persons, including trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation as well as trafficking to obtain human organs, and to create a taxonomy to categorize the results.

They identified 741 citations including reports, journal articles, and books.

• REPORTS: Reports accounted for more than half (58%) of all identified publications. Most (68%) of the 429 report were based on empirical research. There was a preponderance of qualitative methodologies, however 95 reports did rely on quantitative research. Most samples were convenience samples.

• JOURNAL ARTICLES: Two hundrend eighteen journal articles were identified, but only 39 were based on empirical research. All but one used qualitative methodologies, and the samples were generally quite small, and not randomly assigned. Most of the empirical research focuses on trafficking for sexual exploitation; only three out of the 39 journal articles deal with trafficking for labor exploitation and one focuses on domestic servitude. Thirty of the empirical research articles discuss trafficked women, seven discuss trafficked children, and two include discussion of trafficked men. The authors note that "very little is known about trafficking of men and boys, either for sexual exploitation or bonded labor. Only 14 journal articles include discussion of male victims of trafficking and one discusses the plight of male children."

• BOOKS: Ninety four (94) books were identified, the vast majority of which were based on non-empirical research.

Conclusions on the State of Research:

• "The analysis of the compiled bibliography on trafficking in persons suggests that the dominant anti-trafficking discourse is not evidence-based but grounded in the construction of particular mythology of trafficking (Sanghera 2005: 4). Despite the increased interest in human trafficking, relatively little systematic, empirically grounded, and based on solid theoretical underpinnings research has been done on this issue."

• Ideology and activism have seriously contaminated research on Human Trafficking.

• Research on human trafficking is largely disconnected from theory.

• "There is a need for both quantitative and qualitative research that would provide both macro-and micro-level understanding of the trafficking phenomenon. Rigorous ethnographic and sociological studies based on in-depth interviews with trafficking survivors would provide baseline data on trafficking victims and their characteristics."

• "Given the fact that services to trafficked persons are in their infancy, monitoring and evaluation studies should be an integral part of every assistance program, public and private. Well-designed monitoring and evaluation studies, particularly external evaluations, can identify effective policies and ‘best practice’ approaches as well as assess the success of different programs."

• "There is also a need for effective cooperation and coordination of research within and among different regions of the world. In addition, there is a need to establish a forum where research results can be exchanged between different scholars as well as shared with policy makers and service providers; such a forum can take a form of a specialized publication or an international task force."

In addition to the printed bibliography, all citations will be available in an EndNote database from NIJ.

How Armed Groups Make Money from Crime

In the latest issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Bilal Saab and Alexandra Taylor look at the different ways in which Colombian armed groups are connected to criminal activity.

Transnational crime poses a daunting economic security problem. The volume of activity, including the $300-500 billion drug trade, accounts for between 2 and 5 % of the global GDP. Pretty remarkable.

That connections exist between armed groups, including guerillas and insurgents, and transnational crime is rather obvious, but how the connections work is a bit more complicated. Some theories suggest that armed political group develop business arrangements with existing criminal organizations. Others, however, suggest that the once-politically motivated groups are themselves morphing into criminal enterprises. To put it simply: some partner with crime specialists, while others develop their own “in-house” capacity.

“One fundamental characteristic, however, distinguishes armed insurgent groups from organized criminals. Participants in organized crime are motivated by the pursuit of profit, while armed insurgent groups use profits from crime as a means to support their political goals. For an armed group to transition into a criminal organization, it would need to supplant its political motivations with a drive to pursue illegal profits.” P. 457

Saab and Taylor analyze these relationships among the major sub-state armed groups in modern Colombia: (1) The loose coalition of paramilitaries previously organized under the recently demobilized Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and (2) what was once one of the largest guerrilla organizations in the world, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC). Both enterprises – the authors suggest – “derive the majority of their revenues from criminal activities, including kidnapping, extortion, and the protection, production, and trafficking of Andean-grown narcotics. However, paramilitary groups and FARC differ in the level and form of their participation in the international drug trade.” (p. 455)

The authors note that “before its demobilization, the AUC developed the ability engage in almost all levels of drug production and trafficking without resorting to alliances with autonomous criminal organizations (p. 463-4).” They established a vertical presence in the drug trade, as they essentially morphed into a criminal enterprise. FARC, on the other hand, controlled a substantial amount of coca, but made some tactical alliances with a several criminal groups to handle the trafficking and distribution, and instead focused their “in-house” criminal infrastructure development to support
kidnapping and extortion.

“Proponents of “in-house” criminality theories persuasively explain why armed groups and organized criminals would generally avoid collaboration. Such interaction is risky and may increase the likelihood of law enforcement surveillance, and generally such groups are likely to regard each other as market competitors and even political opponents, as violent political insurgents and terrorists seek to upset a comfortable status-quo enjoyed by criminal organizations. Despite these drawbacks, and based on the examples of FARC and the AUC, this article suggests two possible reasons why armed groups would choose to form alliances with criminal organizations over developing “in-house” criminal capabilities. First, some criminal activities—like trafficking and distributing narcotics—require resources and networks that are difficult and costly for an armed group to create. Second, the political environment may make certain criminal activities too politically costly for an armed group to be associated with; thus, armed groups may prefer to form short-term agreements with criminal groups and deny that their members take part in such activities.” P. 468

Saab, B., & Taylor, A. (2009). Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32 (6), 455-475 DOI: 10.1080/10576100902892570

New Globalization of Crime

In the April 6, 2009 Edition of The Nation, Professor Michael T. Klare has written a rather thoughtful article ("Global Crime Wave?") on how the global economic crisis may be pushing a surge in crime that has a transnational impact.

As primary examples, Klare describes the well-known dramatic and dire situations in places like Mexico and Somalia, but he also points to possible impact in key strategic places like China and Russia. Problems like drug trafficking and maritime piracy are not new, of course, but the rising scale, the degree of associated lethal violence, and the state-nonstate connections make these threats much more complex. The resurgence of "Shining Path" in Peru - which started as a Maoist insurgent movement in the 1980s - is now, Klare reports, inextricably connected to the region's transnational cocaine trafficking enterprise.

Klare further describes an emergent and growing syndrome of crime, violence and repression in some nations:

"This syndrome--declining employment in the core economy, growing reliance on jobs in marginal enterprises or in an unofficial black-market economy, and rising rates of violent crime leading to increased state repression--is likely to be repeated in a range of other countries suffering from the global economic crisis."

One result of this global crime epidemic, Klare fears, is a backlash of state repression, leading to human right violations (see earlier post on this site about the link between weak states an human rights abuses):

"Wherever one looks, then, the global economic crisis is destined to be accompanied by rising levels of crime, violence and--increasingly--state repression. Worried governments may attempt to forestall the risk of criminal disorder by spending more on law enforcement or, as in the case of China, stepping up the rate of executions. In a world on the brink, this is unlikely to deter those like the Somali pirates who "only want money so we can protect ourselves from hunger."

Though there is no simple prescription for this growing crisis, Klare joins a chorus of analysts who suggest that economic development effort and security issues are deeply interconnected and that the international policy community should remain mindful of that connection in developing long-term solutions:

"Without a global stimulus effort aimed at those at greatest risk of destitution, hunger and homelessness, expect an epidemic of global crime and boom times for criminal syndicates and cartels everywhere."

To listen to an audio interview with Klare on the coming global crime wave, click here.

Weak states may be hazardous to your health (and your rights).

Human rights abuses are commonly associated with despotic, totalitarian regimes, not with weak and failing states. But Professor Neil Englehart’s recent study of 140 nations suggests that weak states may actually put personal security rights at the greatest risk.

Englehart defined state "capacity" as "the willingness and capability of the state apparatus to carry out government policy" not by a particular government’s stability, longevity, or popularity. He used three measures of capacity: (1) expert opinion on law and order (impartial legal system and general respect for the law); (2) expert opinion on state corruption; and (3) the state’s tax (which fund state services) as a proportion of gross domestic product.

Human right violations were measured by: (1) Political Terror Scale scores based on the US State Department annual human rights reports; (2) CIRI data on extrajudicial killing; and (3) CIRI data on political imprisonment. Each state’s degree of democratic vs authoritarian orientation (Polity IV) was also rated.

State capacity strongly predicted personal rights/security. The weaker the state’s capacity, the greater was the risk of human/personal security violations, except for political imprisonment. Weak state capacity did not predict that nearly as well. Instead, Democracy was the strongest predictor of protection from political imprisonment.

Because states are ultimately responsible to protect their citizens from human right abuses, it is common to blame them when these violations occur and to muster international support to shame the government into compliance. If a state genuinely lacks the capacity to protect its citizens, however, shaming is unlikely to be effective. Instead, this research suggests that bolstering capacity may yield more effective outcomes.

Englehart concludes: "There is an extensive literature suggesting the importance of state capacity for economic development. This suggests that state capacity will have a positive impact on both level of economic development and human rights conditions."

Englehart, N. (2009). State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights Journal of Peace Research, 46 (2), 163-180 DOI: 10.1177/0022343308100713